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THIRTY-SEVENTH WILLIAM & MARY TAX CONFERENCE-1991
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS, PARTNERSHIPS, ESTATES & TRUSTS
Meade Emory
Lane Powell Spears Lubersky
Seattle
BUSINESS INCOME
1. Friedrich v. Comm, 91-1 USTC 50,074 (7th Cir. 1991), affg T.C. Memo.
1989-103. Taxpayer received an advance payment of $100,000 legal fees from client (not
a loan) where promissory note called for below-market (8%) interest and-provided for
"repayment" at the time attorney's fees were due to taxpayer on the closing of the estate of
the client's late husband. CA-7 affirmed on the factual issue determined by the Tax Court.
2. Oak Industries. Inc. 96 T.C. 559 (1991). Security deposits received for
decoder boxes by over-the-air subscription television operator were not includable in gross
income because, in view of taxpayer's express "obligation to repay," it did not enjoy
"complete dominion" over the deposits when they were made (the depositors had unlimited
rights to receive refunds), even though it had unrestricted use of the deposits.
3. U.S.v. Harris, 91-2 USTC 50,433 (7th Cir. 1991). Although a criminal case
it sheds light on what constitutes a "gift" in a romantic relationship. Seems to hold that
transfers from a lover are entitled to be treated by the recipient as gifts "as long as the
relationship consists of something more than payments for specific sessions of sex."
4. LTR 9114023. See, "Shareholder's Transfer Of Stock To Key Employees
Taxable Gift To Other Shareholders," Letter Ruling Review, May 1991, attached.
5. LTR 9034048. See, "If Health Insurance Taxable, Measure Of Value Is Group
Coverage Not Individual Rates," Letter Ruling Review, April 1991, attached.
6. LTR 9104039. See, "Transfer Of Restricted Stock Can Be Rescinded In Same
Year Even If § 83(b) Elections Made," Letter Ruling Review, March 1991, attached.
K:G I\MXl10127MXFMIS
7. LTR 9040025. See, "IRS Withdraws Position That Job Placement Is Not
Working Condition Fringe," Letter Ruling Review November 1990, attached.
DAMAGES
1. Burke y.mm, 91-1 USTC 50,175 (6th Cir. 1991). Amounts received in
settlement of sex discrimination suit were excludable under § 104(a)(2) personal injury
damages (the focus should be on the personal nature of the injury (discrimination) and not
on the consequences of a Title VII violation (payment of back pay for lost wages)).
Threlkeld v. Comm., 88-1 USTC 9370 (6th Cir. 1988) followed.
2. Kurowski v. Comm., 90-2 USTC 50,585 (7th Cir. 1990). Settlement proceeds
received by teacher removed from her tenured position for mental impairment were not §
104(a)(2) damages but were, instead, payments of back salary made for the purpose of
obtaining her resignation. Taxpayer never brought an action based upon tort or tort-type
rights.
3. Charles Dodge, 96 T.C. 172 (1991). Taxpayer not able to exclude from
income under § 104(a)(3) amounts totaling $227,920 received from multiple hospital
indemnification policies; hospital admissions did not relate to actual injuries or sicknesses.
4. LTR 9106013. See, "IRS Finds Punitive Damages For Physical Taxable But
Incorrectly Ignores 1989 Amendment," Letter Ruling Review, March 1991, attached.
5. Burns P. Downey. 97 T.C. No. 10 (1991). Taxpayer airline pilot brought suit
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) against United after he was let
go at age 60. Later he received settlement award which was allocated between back pay
and liquidated damages. Tax Court held that full amount of award is excludable under §
104(a)(2) even that portion allocable to back pay (and upon which United withheld). Court
relies, again, upon point that personal nature of injury rather than derivative consequences
of injury must control. See, also, Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F.2d 542
(9th Cir. 1991), where, in an action against the discriminating employer itself for improperly
withholding taxes, the same result was reached.
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CANCELLATION OF DEBT INCOME
1. Rev. Rut, 91-31. 1191-20 I.R.B. 4. The reduction of the principal amount of
an undersecured nonrecourse debt from $1,000,000 to $800,000 (by the holder of the debt)
results in the realization of § 61(a)(12) discharge of indebtedness income of $200,000, and
not in the reduction of the basis the property securing the debt. Fulton Gold Corp., 31
B.T.A 519 (1934), held to have been rejected by Comm, v Tufts, 461 U.S. 311 (1983) and
Herbert Gershkowitz 88 T.C. 984 (1984). See, "Discharge of Nonrecourse Debt," Tax
&=, June 17, 1991, p. 1461; Sheppard, "Questions Arise From- Cancellation Of
Nonrecourse Debt," Tax Notes May 27, 1991, p. 959; Blanchard, "Discharge Of Nonrecourse
Debt: A Reexamination Of The Distinction Between Recourse And Nonrecourse Debt And
Related Issues," Tax Notes, Feb. 18, 1991, p. 773.
2. LTR 9043027. See, "Debtor Spared Debt Cancellation Income In Settlement
Of Offsetting Claims," Letter Ruling Review, December 1990, attached.
3. Gordon A. Schifie, T.C. Memo. 1991-19. On the payment of $84,000 by
borrowers in recision of a $225,000 mortgage loan made in violation of the Truth in Lending
Act, the $141,000 previously deducted interest and finance charges applied against the
repayment are includable in income under the tax benefit rule. Judge Tannenwald refused
to cut through the "thicket" of income from discharge of indebtedness.
4. LTR 9125010. See, "Exempt Property Not Considered In Measuring
Insolvency Thereby Increasing 108 Exclusion," Letter Ruling Review, August 1991, attached.
See, also, Raby, 'The Insolvency Exception To Discharge Of Indebtedness Income," Tax
Notes, Sept. 9, 1991, p. 1291.
5. LTR 9120010. See, "Income Generated By Abandonment May Be Partly
Eligible For Exclusion Under § 108," Letter Ruling Review, July 1991, attached.
6. US, v. Centennial Savings Bank, 91-1 USTC 50,188 (Sup. Ct. 1991). Penalties
collected by taxpayer bank on the premature withdrawal of federally issued certificates of
deposit were not income from discharge of indebtedness excludable under § 108(a)(1)
because the depositors got everything to which they were entitled and there was no
forgiveness of, or relief from, any obligation to repay.
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DEPRECIATION & AMORTIZATION
1. Tele-Communications. Inc, 95 TC. 495 (1990). A cable franchise is a "franchise"
for § 1253 10-year amortization purposes because that provision applies to all franchises
except those specifically excluded (public as well as private) that satisfy the three elements
of § 1253(b)(1) (i.e., an agreement, giving the right to distribute, sell, or provide goods,
services or facilities within a specified area).
2. Hl y. US, 90-2 USTC 1 50,560 (Ct. Cl. 1990). Unrecovered tangible costs for
improvements with respect to mineral deposits are, though not recoverable through
depreciation, part of the "adjusted basis of the property" in determining the § 57(a)(1)
[formerly § 57(a)(8)] item of tax preference for excess depletion for minimum tax purposes.
The court cited LTR 8314011 as non-binding but instructive.
3. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. U.S., 91-2 USTC 50,451 (3rd Cir. 1991).
Customer list is nondepreciable when acquired with underlying ongoing business. Although
wasting life of lists could be estimated with reasonable accuracy and value, such assets were
nonetheless part of goodwill and nondepreciable.
4. H.R. 3035 (a bill introduced by Chairman Rostenkowski) containing a proposal
relating to the amortization of intangibles). See, Sheppard, 'Amortization of Intangibles:
Something Out Of Nothing," Tax Notes, Aug. 26, 1991, p. 984; "Intangibles and the Real
World," Tax Notes, Sept. 2, 1991; Kies, "Should Goodwill be Amortizable?--An Intoxicating
Question," INotes, Sept. 30, 1991, p. 1649; "14-Year Amortization Period Is A Sore Point
in Intangibles Bill," Tax Notes, Oct. 7, 1991.
5. Ithaca Industries. Inc, 97 T.C. No. 253 (1991). In acquisition of business, value
of goodwill determined according to the residual method. The price of stock allocated
among assets including "assembled work force" and "raw material contracts." An average
per capita amount was assigned to each of its hourly and production work force and staff
and amortized when that person's employment terminated. Tax Court held that work force
not a wasting asset separate and distinct from goodwill and going concern value and,
therefore, not amortizable. The raw material contracts were separate and could be
amortized over the useful life of the contracts.
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1. Rev. Proc. 90-63. 1990-53 I.R.B. 17, revoking Rev. Procs. 89-16 and 89-17.
Provides for an exclusive procedure for taxpayers to obtain IRS consent to change their
method of accounting for capitalizing under § 263 and § 263A package design costs in
accordance with Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85. Three alternative methods are described-
(i) capitalization; (ii) design-by-design capitalization and 60-month amortization, and (iii)
pool-of-cost capitalization and 48-month amortization. Taxpayers not usiig an acceptable
method who do not voluntarily change their method may be required by the IRS on audit
to change their method.
2. AOD No. 1991-07, 1991-7 I.R.B. 5. IRS acquiesces in St. Lukes Hospital, Inc.,
35 T.C. 236 (1960). Income properly reported on cash basis, changed pursuant to
permission, when books and records kept on accrual method with adjusting entries to
reconcile two methods.
3. First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,005 (10th Cir. 1990).
Bank that had elected to report income from the sale of a building on the installment
method was required to recognize the deferred gain under § 453 when the purchase note
was refinanced by the issuance of tax-exempt bonds (even though the bank itself purchased
the bonds).
4. LTR 9043014. See, "Installment Treatment Of Casino Winnings Not Foiled
By Standby Letter Of Credit," Letter Ruling Review, December 1990, attached.
5. Tecumseh Corrugated Box Co. v. Comm, 91-1 USTC 50,255 (6th Cir. 1991).
Sale of real estate to related party trusts were not within the § 453(e)(6)(B) exception to the
§ 453(e) related party installment sale rule for involuntary conversions because the
subsequent sale by the trusts to the Federal government was not under threat of
condemnation.
6. LTR 9121044. "Buyer's Prepayment Of Installments Not Grounds For 453
Election Out," Letter Ruling Review, July 1991, attached.
7. Bright v. U.S., 91-1 USTC 50,142 (5th Cir. 1991). Taxpayer received income
in the year in which she received a check representing proceeds from the sale of stock and
deposited it in her bank account even though her bank refused to use the funds from the
check to purchase government securities until it collected funds from the payor bank in the
following year.
.8. LTR 9123004. See, "axpayers Can Sidestep Capitalization Of Contract
Termination Payments And Deduct Currently," Letter Ruling Review, July 1991, attached.
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9. Notice 91-4. Continues the procedure of Rev. Proc. 75-25, 1975-1 C.B. 720,
which permitted subdividers to request permission to add to basis of property the estimated
future cost of future improvements for the purpose of determining gain or loss resulting
from the sale. This new rule announced pending study of the application of the economic
performance rules (§ 461(h)) to subdividers.
LOSSES & AT-RISK
1. Charles E Alexander, 95 T.C. 467 (1990) (reviewed), on respondent's motion for
reconsideration of T.C. Memo. 1990-114. The § 465(b)(3) at-risk automatic nonrecourse
provision, which excludes from the amount at-risk any borrowings from persons having an
interest in the activity or from persons related to those persons, does not apply to computer
software research and development activities or to any activities other than the four "old
activities" of movies, farming, leasing and oil and gas because the at-risk automatic
nonrecourse provision applies to § 465(c)(3) "new activities" only to the extent Treasury has
promulgated regulations under § 465(c)(3)(D) and Treasury has not done so (despite the
fact that § 465(c)(3) was added by the 1978 Act). See, also, LTR 9132004; "Due To Lack
Of Regs IRS Refuses To Exclude Related Party Debt From Amount At-Risk," Letter Ruling
Revew September 1991, attached.
2. Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,187 (Sup. Ct. 1991). S&Ls
were entitled to realize deductible losses on FHLB Memorandum R-49 exchanges of
mortgages for "substantially related" mortgages held by other lenders because § 1001(a)
provides for realization of losses on the exchange of properties that are "materially different"
in the sense that they embody legally distinct entitlement. See, Hollingsworth, "Loss
recognition in S&L Mortgage Exchanges: The 'Clear Reflection of Income' Approach." Tax
N=, Aug. 12, 1991, p. 815; Sax, "Supreme Court Decides Fundamental Debt Discharge,
Loss Realization Issues," 75 J. Tax. 54 (1991).
3. LTR 9035005. See, "Partnerships Can't Be Aggregated For At-Risk Rules,"
Letter Ruling Review, October 1990, attached.
4. LTR 9116029. See, "Interest On Installment Sale Contracts Inherited By
Successor Partnership Avoids Portfolio Label," Letter Ruling Review, June 1991, attached.
5. Smith v. Comm, 91-2 USTC 50,326 (6th Cir. 1991). Reversing the Tax
Court CA-6 holds that in applying § 183 it is not necessary that the transaction was "likely
to be profitable" but only whether the taxpayer entered the activity with a profit objective.
6. PALs and estates & trusts. See, "No PAL Guidance Forthcoming in Estate
and Trust Area," Tax Notes, May 27, 1991, p. 975.
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7. Passive actiVity loss relief for real estate. See, 'Twenty House TaxwritersSponsor Passive Loss Relief for Real Estate," Tax Notes, April 15, 1991, p. 142. Little
chance soon for legislative change despite fact that a majority of House Ways & Means
Committee would vote for it.
8. Lerman v, Comm, 939 E2d 44 (3rd Cir 1991), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1988-570. It
was held that losses generated from commodity dealers' sham straddle transactions cannot
form the basis of a deduction. The trade or business loss presumption of § 108(b) of
DEFRA cannot be claimed by commodities dealers unless they have an actual loss.
9. Smith v. Comm., 91-2 USTC 50,326 (6th Cir. 1991). Partnership allowed
losses flowing from investment in synthetic fuel process even though investment was risky
and tax savings were a critical element. What mattered was that there was a business
purpose behind the venture and there was a reasonable possibility of realizing a profit. Cf.,
Karr v. Comm., 91-2 USTC 50,113 (11th Cir. 1991). See, Sheppard, "The Karr and Smith
Appeals: Deconstruction of Tax Shelters," Tax Notes, July 29, 1991, p. 519.
CAPITAL GAIN & LOSS
1. Chilingirian v. Comm., 90-2 USTC 50,569 (6th Cir. 1990). The amount
realized from a disposition of property in a foreclosure sale includes the amount of personal
liabilities from which the transferor is discharged as a result of the disposition.
2. Azar Nut Co. v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,257 (5th Cir. 1991). Residence
purchased at FMV from corporation's terminated president and resold at a $111,000 loss
was not § 1221(2) property "used in the taxpayer's trade or business" because the property
had no meaningful association with the business after it was acquired. The Corn Products
doctrine was limited by Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm., 485 U.S. 212 (1988). See, Sheppard,
"Losses on Sales of Employees' Houses After Azar Nut, Tax Notes June 10, 1991, p. 1233;
"Did Azar Nut's Accountants Crack Enough Nuts?," Tax Notes, July 15, 1991, p. 329. See,
also, LTR 9036003; "Capitalization Of Expenses And Capital Loss Treatment Flow From
Charging Sale Of Relocating Employee's Home To Employer," Letter Ruling Review,
October 1990, attached.
3. Circle K Corp. v. U.S., 91-1 USTC 1 50,260 (Ct. Cl. 1991). Oil company stock
purchased by convenience store chain company in 1980 to ensure a supply of gasoline, held
to generate an ordinary loss on sale under § 1221(1) because the stock investment (under
the "source of supply" principle) had a "close connection" to its business as an integral part
of its "inventory purchase system" even though any crude oil purchased would have been at
the "highest economic price." Arkansas Best Corp. purportedly followed in this summary
judgment decision. See, Sheppard, "Circle K: How Taxpayer Choice Survives Arkansas
Best," Tax Notes, June 17, 1991, p. 1359.
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4. Guardian Industries Corp. 97 T.C. No. 21 (1991). Photo-finisher's proceeds
from sales of sliver waste are ordinary income.
NONRECOGNITION PROVISIONS
1. LTR 9131034. See, "Timber Owner's § 631 Gain Caused By 'Hugo' Eligible
For § 1033," Letter Ruling Review, September 1991, attached.
2. LTR 9118017. See, "For § 121 To Be Available For Residence In Trust
Grantor Trust Provisions Must Apply," Letter Ruling Review June 1991, attached.
3. LTR 9118007. See, "IRS Wrestles With 1033 Qualification When Proceeds
Invested In Improvements On Retained Property," Letter Ruling Review, June 1991,
attached.
4. LTR 9052019. See, "Quest For Security In Deferred 1031 Exchange Must Be
Handled Nimbly," Letter Ruling Review, February 1991, attached.
BUSINES EXPENSES
1. Rev. Procs. 90-59 & 90-60) 1990-52 I.R.B. 23 & 29 provide updated 1991 rates
for mileage (27.5 cents) and per diem and meal allowances.
2. Proposed Regulations (EE-42-91) under §§ 61 and 132 relating to (i) employer
provided transportation furnished because of unsafe conditions and (ii) the exclusion for
public transit passes (ER. 5/20/91). See, Hevener, 'Taxation of Black Cars: Amended
Valuation and Exclusion Rules For Commutes in Certain Urban Areas," Tax Notes, June
10, 1991, p. 1293.
3. Rev. Rul. 90-93, 1990-45 I.R.B. 4. A full-time life insurance salesman, treated
as an employee for FICA purposes under § 3121(d)(3), is not an employee for purposes of
§§ 62 and 67 with respect to deducting business expenses. The holding also applies to all
other § 3121(d)(3) statutory employees--individuals in specified occupational groups (i.e.,
agent-drivers, commission-drivers, home workers, traveling and city salesmen) who are not
common law employees.
4. Cadwallader v. Comm., 90-2 USTC 50,597 (7th Cir. 1990), affg T.C. Memo.
1989-356. College professor not entitled to a § 280A home office deduction where the
university provided him with adequate office space and the taxpayer's principal place of
8
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business is on campus because his home office is not needed and is, therefore, not
maintained for the convenience of his employer as the employee's principal place of
business.
5. Soliman v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 1 50,291 (4th Cir. 1991), aff'g 94 T.C. 20
(1990). Anesthesiologist's home office expenses were deductible under § 280A(c)(1) because
the home office was taxpayer's "principal place of business" under the Tax Court's new "facts
and circumstances" test which replaced the "focal point" test. The taxpayer spent a
substantial amount of time in that office preforming essential managerial/administrative
functions and there was no other location for the performance of such functions. Dissent
on the ground taxpayer did not do his most important work at the home office nor did he
spend the majority of his time there (following Pomerantz v. Comm., 88-2 USTC 9588 (9th
Cir. 1988)).
6. LTR 9112003. See, "IRS Positive In Allowing Expenses For Grad Tax Law
Study," Letter Ruling Review, May 1991, attached.
7. B. Philip Citron, 97 T.C. No. 200 (1991). Tax shelter investor allowed an
ordinary loss from the "abandonment" of partnership interest. See, Sheppard,
'Abandonment of Partnership Interests and the Strange Case of Philip Citron," Tax Notes,
Sept. 9, 1991, p. 1241. See, also, Echols v. Comm., 91-2 USTC 50,360 (5th Cir. 1991).
DIVORCE
1. LTR 9123053. See, "IRS rules that subsequently transferred property in
divorce context eligible for treatment as property settlement," Letter Ruling Review, July
1991, attached.
2. LTR 9046004. "See, 'Tax Burden on 'Ripe' Stock Sale Can Be Shifted To
Spouse If Transfer Incident To Divorce," Letter Ruling Review, January 1991, attached.
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PERSONAL & INDIVIDUAL DEDUCTIONS
1. Pdry .Comm, 912 E2d 1466 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'g 92 T.C. 470 (1989).
Taxpayer not entitled to § 166 bad debt deduction by reason of her ex-husband's failure to
make court ordered child support and alimony payments because she lacked a basis in the
debt.
2. Andrews v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,211 (1st Cir. 1991), vacating and
remanding T.C. Memo. 1990-391. A taxpayer with a 6-month winter horse business in
Florida and a 6-month summer pool construction in Massachusetts did not have (as the Tax
Court said) two "tax homes" for purposes of § 162(a)(2) and is entitled to deduct the
duplicate living expenses incurred at the location which is the "minor" post of duty while
away from the "major" post (which is the taxpayer's one and only tax home).
3. Joseph A. Barrett, 96 T.C. 713 (1991). Settlement of insider trading suits in
1984 by disgorging $54,000 of taxpayer's 1981 short-term capital gain profit of $189,000
entitles taxpayer to use of § 1341(a)(5) to obtain credit in 1984 equal to the tax attributable
to the inclusion of the $54,000 in 1981 gross income. The 1984 settlement established that
the taxpayer had a legal obligation to restore the item meaning that it "was established...that
[he] did not have an unrestricted right to the item." Legal fees gave rise to short-term
capital loss.
4. LTR 9038023. See, "Security In Addition To The Residence Does Not Foil
'Qualified Residence Interest'," Letter Ruling Review November 1990, attached. See, also,
"Home Equity Loans Draw Renewed Concern," TaNoe, Aug. 19, 1991, p. 872.
5. LTR 9126014. See, "IRS sweeps most of tax preparation fees into
miscellaneous itemized deduction category," Letter Ruling Review. August 1991, attached.
See, also, "Deducting Tax-Related Professional Fees," Tax Notes, June 24, 1991, p. 1575.
6. LTR 9039023. See, "IRS Allows Defense Costs Of Director Under § 212,"
Letter Ruling Review, November 1990, attached.
7. Accardo v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,405 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'g 94 T.C. 96
(1990). Legal expenses of taxpayer acquitted on RICO charges are nondeductible under §
212 and are not made deductible by possibility of forfeiture of 3 certificates of deposit under
the RICO statute.
10
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EXEMPT' ORGANIZATIONS & CHAR1TABLE GIVING
1. NCAA v, Comm, 90-2 USTC t 50,513 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'g 92 T.C. 456(1989). Revenue received from basketball tournament program advertising did not
constitute UBI because the NCAAs selling of advertising business was not "regularly carried
on" as defined in Reg. § 1.513-1(c) because the programs were distributed over less than a
3 week span at a once-a-year event and the business was not in unfair competition with
other publications soliciting the same advertisers.
2. LTR 9044071. See, "Small Ads In Program Book Don't Generate UBI, But
Larger Ones Do," Letter Ruling Review, January 1991, attached.
3. Rev. RuL 90-111, 1990-53 I.R.B. 5. Carryovers of excess (i.e., over the §
170(b) percentage limit) 1991 contributions of § 170(b)(1)(C)(iv) capital gain tangible
personal property do not generate § 57(a)(6) items of tax preference for AMT purposes in
succeeding taxable years. However, carryovers from 1990 to 1991 do generate preference
amounts.
4. LTR 9035054. See, "§ 170 Deduction To Buyer Of Nonprofit's Stock, But IRS
Scrutinizes," Letter Ruling Review, October 1990, attached.
5. American Postal Workers Union v U.S 91-1 USTC 50,096 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Annual fees received from non-postal Federal employees in return for their access to the
union's health plan were § 512 UBI because providing health was not "substantially related
to" the union's tax exempt purposes of representing postal workers in collective bargaining
and arbitration.
6. IRC 4 56(a)(6). Provision effective only during 1991 exempts gifts of
appreciated tangible personal property from the items of tax preference that must be
included in the computation of a taxpayer's AMT. See, "Donations Stream Into Museums
Through One-Year AMT Window," Tax Notes, May 6, 1991, p. 559.
7. LTR 9044047. See, "Settlement Distribution Of Appreciated Property To
Charitable Beneficiary Results In Deduction," Letter Ruling Review, January 1991, attached.
8. Atlanta Athletic Club, T.C. Memo. 1991-83. Social club was required to
include the $2,300,000 gain from the sale of property across the highway from its golf course
as UBI because the property was not directly used for exempt functions prior to its sale (as
required by § 512(a)(3)(D)) for nonrecognition treatment (provided that the proceeds are
reinvested by the club)).
11
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9. LTR 9110016. See, "IRS Invokes Local Law To Strike Down Charitable
Contribution Of Life Insurance," Letter Ruling Review, April 1991, attached.
10. LTR 9110042. See, "Exempt Hospital Can Open Its Fitness Center To Public
Without UBI," Letter Ruling Review, April 1991, attached.
11. IRC 4 501(h) election. Regarding whether eligible charities should make the
lobbying election under § 501(h) see, 'An Open Letter to Eligible Charities Regarding the
501(h) Election," Tax Notes, May 6, 1991, p. 655.
PARTNERSHIPS
1. Campbell v. Comm., 91-2 USTC 50,420 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'g T.C. Memo.
1990-162. Partnership profits interest received in exchange for the performance of services
not includable in income in the year of receipt since the profits interests had only
speculative value. Diamond v. Comm, 492 E2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974), distinguished in that
case the service partner, who sold his partnership interest shortly after receiving it, became
a partner solely to avoid recognizing ordinary income and did not intend to function as or
to remain a partner. See, Handler, 'Another Opportunity For Hyperlexis: Campbell v. CIR,"
Tax Notes, June 3, 1991, p. 1175; Townsend, 'The Controversy Over Campbell: Slicing The
Bologna Too Thin," Tax Notes, July 1, 1991, p. p.83 (both published before appellate
decision); Sheppard, "Eighth Circuit Further Confuses Diamond Issue In Campbell," Tax
Notes, Sept. 16, 1991, p. 1353.
2. Lonn A. Trost, 95 T.C. 560 (1991). Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to determine
overpayment attributable to partnership items in a proceeding for redetermination of
deficiencies attributable to nonpartnership items (even though an FPAA had been previously
issued to the partnership).
3. Estate of Ouirk v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,148 (6th Cir. 1991). Taxpayer's
withdrawal from partnership in 1974, with about 10% of 1974 and 1975 payments allocated
to § 736(b) (capital treatment) and about 90% of such payments allocated to § 736(a)
(ordinary income treatment for distributions attributable to partnership unrealized
receivables), was given effect for § 736 purposes for those years even though taxpayer
litigated the amount he was entitled to receive in state court until 1985.
4. Young v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,045 (9th Cir 1991), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1987-
397. Allocation of 75% of losses of partnership to a limited partner with a 10% partnership
interest lacked economic substance (under pre-1976 law) because partnership distributions
remained unchanged by the loss allocation provision. Partnership capital accounts need not
have been marked to market and the existence of a tax-related bargained-for business
purpose for the allocation is irrelevant.
12
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5. Disgmised sale 1Egs. Proposed regulations (PS-163-84) under § 707(a)(2)(B),
relating to partnership "disguised sales." (ER. 4/25/91.) See, Rubin, Silverman, and
McBumey, "The Proposed Disguised Sale Regulations," Tax Notes, Aug. 26, 1991, p. 1051.
6. Muserlian v. Comm 91-1 USTC § 50,204 (2nd Cir. 1991). Partnership was
not entitled to step-up basis in depreciable assets under § 743(b) (pursuant to a § 754
election) beyond the $1.283 million fair market value of partner's proportionate share of
total assets where the $1.117 million excess purchase price could not be allocated to an
amortizable intangible.
7. Rev. Rul. 91-3Z 1991-20 I.R.B. 20. U.S. tax consequences (U.S. source ECI
gain or loss) of a foreign partner's disposition of an interest in a foreign partnership that
conducts a business in the U.S.
8. Estate of Newman v. Comm. 91-1 USTC 50,281 (2nd Cir 1991), rev'g T.C.
Memo. 1990-230. A solvent limited partner does not have cancellation of indebtedness
income by reason of the discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent partnership because the
(pre-1980 Bankruptcy Tax Act) insolvency exception to the discharge of indebtedness
doctrine was applicable at the partnership level. However, partner not entitled to a basis
increase under § 705(a)(1)(B) by reason of the excluded cancellation of indebtedness
income. Herbert Gershkowitz, 88 T.C. 984 (1987), not followed for one of the same
partnerships; the court relied on U.S. v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (Sup. Ct. 1973);, and
Stackhouse v. U.S., 441 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1971).
9. Richard E. Garcia, 96 T.C. 792 (1991). Partner's $102,000 share of 1985
partnership loss is not rendered nondeductible solely by reason of his filing a lawsuit in 1986
demanding rescission of the partnership agreement and return of his $137,000 capital
investment because the § 165 rule that losses must be evidenced by closed transactions, with
any reasonable prospect of recovery on a claim for reimbursement, does not apply to a
partner's distributive share of partnership bottom line losses under §§ 702(a) and 704.
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PROCEDURE & PENALTIES
1. Rev. Proc. 9119, 1991-10 I.R.B. 24. Relates to adequate disclosure for
avoiding: (i) the § 6662(d) substantial understatement aspect of the accuracy-related penalty
and (ii) the § 6694(a) preparer penalty.
2. Robert C. Lyom T.C. Memo. 1991-84. Commissioner's denial of waiver of
§ 6661 substantial understatement penalty was an abuse of his discretion where taxpayers
made reasonable and good faith efforts to report their tax liability properly even though they
understated their $254,425 correct tax liability for 1982 by $250,000. Taxpayers also found
not to be negligent.
3. Steven J. Cannat, T.C. Memo. 1990-502. Extensions of time to file (reporting
zero estimated tax liability) were valid because taxpayers did not fail to "properly estimate"
their tax liability even though their accountant overlooked a Form 1099-MISC reflecting a
$195,825 income item when he calculated taxpayers' estimated tax liability (so taxpayers
were not liable for the § 6651(a)(1) failure to file penalty). Ottis B. Crocker Jr., 92 T.C. 899
(1989), distinguished.
4. Cheek v. US, 91-1 USTC 50,012 (Sup. Ct. 1991). Conviction of Amer.
Airlines pilot for § 7201 tax evasion and § 7203 failure to file vacated and remanded
(remand, 91-1 USTC 50,232 (1991)) because jury instructions failed to state that
defendant's good-faith belief (whether or not objectively reasonable) that the Internal
Revenue Code did not purport to treat wages as income would negate the government's
burden of proving willfulness, but defendant's belief that the tax statutes are unconstitutional
would be irrelevant because defendant who willfully refuses to comply with duties placed
on him takes the risk of being wrong.
5. Denenburg v. U.S., 91-1 USTC 50,014 (5th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment
upheld § 6651 late filing penalties imposed on taxpayer whose CPA was unwilling to prepare
and sign tax returns not supported by business documentation which was unavailable at the
due date of those returns due to continuing ill-will between the taxpayer and his brothers,
which did not constitute "reasonable cause" for failing to file timely.
6. Accuracy-related penalty regs. Proposed regulations (IA-015-90) under §8
6662 and 6664, as amended by OBRA 1989, relating to the accuracy-related penalties for
negligence, substantial understatement and valuation misstatements. (ER. 3/4/91.) See,
generally, Zelenak, "Reforming Penalty Reform: Congress Should Eliminate The Profusion
Of Accuracy Standards," Tax Notes July 22, 1991, p. 471.
7. Bode v. US., 91-1 USTC 50,013 (5th Cir. 1990). Attorney's fee award of
$150 per hour for 600 hours of work on a § 183 horse breeding and racing case remanded
for further findings including the number of hours awarded and availability of counsel with
14
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quarterhorse expertise at less than $5,000 per day of trial (but not tax lawyers who could
handle the complexities of the instant case at less than $150 per hour).
8. Estate of Perry v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,283 and 60,073 (5th Cir. 1991).
Attorneys' fees under § 7430 awarded on government's appeal on issue lost in two circuits
[whether ERTAs amendment of § 2035 overruled Bel v, U.S., 452 E 2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971)]
despite Solicitor General's authorization of the appeal following "careful consideration."
The issue is "substantial justification" not good faith. ('A policy decision to continue to whip
a dead horse in circuit after circuit in the hope, however vain, of establishing a conflict is
clearly is clearly an option within the discretion of the Commissioner. That does not,
however, substantially justify his causing an innocent taxpayer in each circuit to expend
attorneys' fees for the dubious honor of being the Commissioner's guinea pig.")
9. Portillo v. Comm, 91-2 USTC 50,304 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'g, affg and
remanding T.C. Memo. 1990-68. IRS made a § 6212(a) "determination" with respect to
subcontractor-taxpayer when it matched a contractor's $35,000 Form 1099 to taxpayer's
Form 1040, even though IRS did not attempt to establish the reliability of the portion of the
Form 1099 relating to undocumented cash payments of $21,000. However, the notice of
deficiency was not entitled to the presumption of correctness because it "lacks any 'ligaments
of fact"' and the IRS did not present "some predicate evidence supporting its determination."
10. Donald R. Coffey, 96 T.C. 161 (1991) (reviewed). Invalid notice of deficiency
(here, misaddressed), or an invalid assessment based upon it, does not terminate a Form
872-A agreement extending the statute of limitations. The Tax Court will no longer follow
its holding in Louis E. Roszkos, 87 T.C. 1255 (1986), rev'd 850 F2d 514 (9th Cir. 1988).
11. Calumet Industries. Inc, 95 T.C. 257 (1990). IRS not barred from assessing
a deficiency for an open year (1979) attributable to an NOL carryback adjustment from an
otherwise closed year (1981) because § 6501(h) (permitting a deficiency to be assessed in
an otherwise closed year based upon the adjustment of an NOL carryback from an open
year) is inapplicable and does not nullify the agreed-upon § 6501(c)(4) extension for 1979.
12. Kenneth C. Hill 95 T.C. 437 (1990). The statute of limitations does not bar
assessment of tax in an open year resulting from a reduction of the investment tax credit
carryover as the result of IRS increase in the amount of tax for the closed year.
13. Smith v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,071 (8th Cir. 1991). Statute of limitations
does not bar the claim of an increased deficiency for 1976 resulting from the disallowance
of NOL claimed in 1979 and carried back to 1976, where there was an agreement 1976
would remain open.
15
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14. Siben . Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,215 (2nd Cir. 1991). The statute of
limitations for assessing tax against partners based on adjustment to partnership items was
measured from the date of the partners' returns, not the partnership return. Kelley v.
Comrn., 877 F. 2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989); Fendell v. Comm., 906 F 2d 362 (8th Cir. 1990), not
followed.
15. Kathryn Winne, 96 T.C. 802 (1991). The statute of limitations on a return
containing Form 2555 filed with the wrong Service Center (Ogden on Aug. 1, 1986) does
not begin to run until the return could have been received by the proper Service Center
(Philadelphia, no earlier than Aug. 19, 1986), so a notice of deficiency, mailed on Aug. 17,
1989 was timely.
16. Jack H. Berry, 97 T.C. No. 23 (1991). Taxpayers, who were nonfilers for 1982,
overpaid through withholding. Taxpayers had executed a Form 872-A with respect to that
year. After IRS issued notice of deficiency (1989) taxpayers filed income tax return showing
overpayment with which the IRS subsequently agreed. Tax Court held that claim (the late
return) was not filed within required time period (§ 6512(b)(3)(B)) providing that credit or
refund limited to the portion of the tax paid during the 2 year period preceding the mailing
of the deficiency notice). The Form 872-A consent agreement did not revive the expired
time period for filing a claim for refund or credit.
17. LM 97 T.C. No. 20 (1991). Taxpayer executed Form 5213
("Election to Postpone Determination with Respect to the Presumption that an Activity is
Engaged in for Profit"). For a new activity taxpayer can elect to delay a determination as
to the general for-profit presumption until the end of the 5-year test period. In Jan. 1989
taxpayer executed a Form 872 extending statute of limitations for 1983 until Dec. 31, 1989.
Tax Court held that Form 872 agreement was timely made even though § 183 provides for
no extension of the delay period under § 183(e). However, extension effective only with
respect to deficiencies arising from the § 183 activity.
18. Erdahl v. Comm., 91-1 USTC 50,184 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'g and remanding
T.C. Memo. 1990-101. Wife eligible for innocent spouse relief (§ 6013(e)) on tax shelter
deductions even though she had knowledge of the purchase of the investment in the limited
partnership. Remanded to the Tax Court for a determination as to whether she had a duty
to inquire (i.e., "whether a reasonably prudent taxpayer in her position would be led to
question the legitimacy of the deduction"). The court adopted the standard in Price v.
Comm., 887 F 2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989).
19. Rev. Proc. 91-25, 1991-20 I.R.B. 25, modifying Rev. Procs. 91-1 and 91-2.
Requests for extension of time or other relief under Reg. § 1.9100-1 after examination of
taxpayer's return has begun are ruling requests subject to payment of user fees.
16
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20. Amendment of Procedural Rules (§§ 601.501-601.509) relating to the
representation of taxpayers before the IRS under the authority of a power of attorney (May
24, 1991). Replaces Form 2848-D, 'Tax Information Authorization and Declaration of
Representative," with Form 8821. See, Raby, "Powers of Attorney: New Procedures and
Forms," Tax Notes, Aug. 12, 1991, p. 812.
21. LTR 9127004. See, "When Carryback Used Against Prior Deficiency Interest
Stops On Due Date Even When Return Is Tardy," Letter Ruling Review, August 1991,
attached.
22. LTR 9111005. See, 'Abatement Of Delinquency Penalty By Service Center
Not 'Final'," Letter Ruling Review, April 1991, attached.
23. Acock. Schleel Architects. Inc, 97 T.C. No. 24 (1991). A nonparty to an IRS
investigation who voluntarily executes an affidavit concerning taxpayer's corporate tax
returns waives 5th Amendment privilege that nonparty may have otherwise possessed; pre-
existing privilege not a bar to taxpayer's attempt to obtain affidavit through formal discovery.
24. Philadelphia & Reading Corp. v. U.S.. 91-2 USTC 50,448 (3rd Cir. 1991).
Taxpayer executed a Form 870 but with a condition, i.e., to offset later overpayments against
the deficiencies before assessing the latter. The IRS' failure to do this resulted in the
assessments being illegal and entitling the taxpayer to refund of the entire amount of the
illegal assessments.
25. Mary ayA , 96 T.C. 459 (1991). Adopts new standards for the issuance of
protective orders to prevent the use in Tax Court of information obtained pursuant to an
IRS administrative summons. The decision indicates the threshold taxpayers must achieve
to warrant a Westreco-type protection order (see, Westreco. Inc., T.C. Memo. 1990-501).
See, "IRS Bolstered by Decision in Mary Kay Ash Case," Tax Notes, April 1, 1991, p. 1461;
Zapruder and Pies, 'The Effect Of The Ash Decision On The Issuance Of Protective Orders
For Cases Pending In Tax Court," Tax Notes, April 29, 1991, p. 505.
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LETTER RULING REVIEW
May, 1991
;HAREHOLDER'S TRANSFER
)F STOCK TO KEY
LMPLOYEES TAXABLE GIFT
['O OTHER SHAREHOLDERS
The distribution of stock to key employees as a
eward for services certainly has tax consequences to the
.mployces receiving the property and to the corporation
tself If the source of the transferred stock is a
hareholder of the corporation it is the Service's view
hat gift tax consequences could result. In LTR 9114023
he taxpayer who owned some, but less than all, of the
;tock of a corporation, decided to transfer a portion of
is ownership to key employees of the corporation in
,etum for their contribution to its growth and success.2
rhe IRS zeroed in on the potential gift tax consequences
f such a transfer.
Shareholder considered to have made a contribu-
tion to the capital of the corporation. The seed for
treating the transfer, by a shareholder, of stock in a
corporation to its employees as a contribution to the
capital of that corporation, and immediately thereafter a
transfer by the corporation of property to the employees,
appears to lie in regulations under §83. 3 It is by using
this rationale that the IRS concluded4 that the corpora-
The employees, if the stock was not subject to restrictions.
would have to include that value received in income (§83) and the
corporation should be entitled to a deduction under §162 (see
§83(h)).
2 Actually the stock was held in a revocable trust but since the
transfer to the trust was not a completed gift that factual nuance is not
significant (the transfer of the stock to the employees by the trust
would be regarded as a transfer by the taxpayer).
3 Reg. §1.83-6(d).
' E.g., Rev. Rul. 80-19,1980-2 C.B. 1254.
tion would be entitled to a deduction equal to the amount
included in income by the employees. In LTR 9114023
the IRS takes a step beyond that conclusion by treating
the taxpayer as having made a gift for gift tax purposes
to the other shareholders.5 The taxpayer is considered to
have made a capital contribution to the corporation
which indirectly is viewed as a gratuitous transfer to its
shareholders.6 Not considered in LTR 9114023 is the
principle that a transfer made in the ordinary course of
business (which this presumably was) is considered
made for a consideration in money or money's worth
and therefore not subject to the gift tax.7 Adding to the
unwelcome result was the conclusion that the indirect
gift to shareholders constituted a gift of a future interest
(since the donee shareholders "do not have an un-
restricted right to the immediate possession of an in-
crease in the corporate capital") and, therefore, was in-
eligible for the annual per-donee exclusion.8
LETTER RULING REVIEW
April, 1991
IF HEALTH INSURANCE
TAXABLE, MEASURE OF
VALUE IS GROUP COVERAGE
NOT INDIVIDUAL RATES
Recently the IRS faced the issue of whether the
premiums for health insurance provided to a "nonspouse
cohabitant" of an employee were excludable under § 106.
Gingerly, the Service concluded that while the
employee's cohabitant was not a spouse (unless perhaps
state law recognized common law marriage and the
cohabitant as a marriage partner) the possibility existed
for classification as a "dependent."4 L Absent such a clas-
sification, and it would be lacking in many cases, the
employee would be taxed on the "'fair market value" of
the coverage provided, through the employee, to an in-
dividual who is not a spouse or dependent of the
employee.42 If the employee was to be taxed on the
coverage provided to theemployee's cohabitant, the prior
holding (LTR 9034048) was clear in that it would
measure that taxation by the "amount that an individual
would have to pay for tie particular coverage in an
arm's-length transaction (i.e., individual policy rates)."
This justification for this position was, of course, the
mandate in the fringe benefit regulations that fair market
value is to be determined by what would have to be paid
"for the particular fringe in an arm's-length transaction"
andthat both the employee's "perception of the value"
and "the cost incurred by the employer" are not deter-
minative.4 3
IRS backs off harsh position. The fact that individual
medical insurance rates are significantly higher than
group rates no doubt prompted the city government
employer to request reconsideration. In LTR 9111018
the IRS calls forth the same principles and, almost mys-
tically, reaches an apparently less harsh result, i.e., that
the amount required to be included is the "fair market
value of the group medical coverage" (noting that it could
be "substantially less" than the fair market value of
individual coverage). LTR 9111018 stops with this con-
clusion, and does not give any guidance as to what that
value would be. Value data on individual rates is, of
course, readily available but the same cannot be said
regarding the "fair market value" of an individual's par-
ticipation in a group plan. Since the cost of plan coverage
varies greatly from plan to plan it would seem that the
most reliable measure of value of a particular individual's
participation in a group plan would be the cost of that
individual's participation and yet the regulations4
specifically reject that method of valuation. Maybe it
is enough at this point to know that the IRS has backed
off its prior harsh position.
41 'Way Open For Exclusion of Health Insurance Premiums
Attributable to 'Nonspouse Cohabitant,"' Letter Ruling Review,
October 1990, p. 6.
42 Reg. § 106-1 excludes from income employer contributions to
a health plan to compensate the employee for injuries or sickness
"incurred by him, his spouse. orhis depentdents..."Similarly. benefits
paid under such a plan are excludable if made to the taxpayer to
z'imburse him -for the medical carm...of the taxpayer, his spouse, and
his dependents-." § 105(b).
43 Reg. § 1.61-2 1(b)2).
" Reg. §1.61-21(b)(2). Cf.. 1.61-21(b)(3).
45 The Service's modified stance has appeal (it is. after all. par-
ticipation in a group policy, and not individual policy rights, that was
transferred by the employer). While the prior harsh position made
valuation easier it lacked a certain logic. The new position makes
moe sense but. unles:s employer cost becomes the valuation measure.
it may make valuation mote difficult. In a similar ruling (LTR
9109060) the IRS stated that the employer-provided coverage to a
nondependent was includable in the employee's income in an amount
equal to the "excess of the fair market value of the group medical
coverage...over the amount paid by the employee for such coverage.'
but sidestepped any effort to determine value as not being an issue
on which the IRS rules. Rev. Prc. 90-3. 1990-1 LILB. 54. §4.021.
LETTER RULING REVIEW
March, 1991
TRANSFER OF RESTRICTED
STOCK CAN BE RESCINDED IN
SAME YEAR EVEN IF §83(b)
ELECTIONS MADE
If there are substantial restrictions on property trans-
ferred in connection with the performance of services,
which restrictions would result in risk of forfeiture, in-
come is not recognized under §83 until the first taxable
year in which the rights either are no longer subject to
such risk of forfeiture or can be transfeled free of such
restriction. 47 The significant downside for this deferral
is that the property will have appreciated considerably
at the time at which the restriction lapses thus increasi
the spread and compelling a larger income inclusion.
This causes recipients of restricted property to closely
consider a §83(b) election which will cause income in-
clusion in the year in which the property is received
measured by the excess of the value of the property at
that time (without regard to the restrictions which may
lapse) over the amount paid for the property.49 Among
the chief characteristics of this election are the short
time-fuse on its exercise (not later than 30 days after the
46 For example, LTR 8238055. which involved an accountant
(who could also have occupied the "family counsellor" role) looked
at how the fee was determined (a percentage of theestate) and whether
the corpus consisted ofbusiness or investment property. in concluding
that self-employment income was not involved. Also found relevant
(as it was in McDoweU v. Ribicof, 292 F.2d 174 (3rd Cir. 1961))
was the length of time needed to wrap up the estate. If, for example,
a tust was to exist for many years that might possibly be relevant in
determining the sam of the fiduciary. Furnher. although Cresence
E. Clarke, 27 T.C 861 (1957), found the trustee of a single real estate
trust to be in receipt of self-employment income, the IRS can draw
little solace from that holding as it is, at bottom, a case involving a
failure of proof by the taxpayer.
47 §83(a). During the period that the property is in the employee's
hands, but not vested, it is treated as owned by the employer (e.g,
dividends on forfeitable stock ae treated as compensation for services
and deductible as such by the employer). Reg. §1.83-(a)(l).
E.g, the transfer of stock to an employee contingent upon that
individual's continued employment for a three year period with the
employer.
49 If the property is subsequently forfeited the taxpayer may not
deduct the amount previously included in income (§83(b)) but the
regulations (Reg. § 1.83-2(a)) permit any amount paid for the property
to be deducted as a loss from the forfeiture.
date the property was transferred),5 0and the strict rules
against revoking the election once made.
5 1
Rescission of transfer after 83(b) election made. In
LTR 9104039 transfers of restricted stock were made to
employees in April 1990, allofwhom made timely §83(b)
elections to include the spread in income at that time. In
July of that year the employer's accounting staffinformed
the employer that the value of the restricted stock would
compel a charge to corporate earnings 655 percent larger
than anticipated, which information compelled a decision
to rescind the already accomplished transfer and to re-
quire the return of the transferred stock. Swiftnrme of
action and compliant employees (hopefully to be
rewarded another day) caused the Service to acknow-
ledge the effectiveness of the rescission "with the result
that he stock grant will be disregarded for federal tax
purposes. 5 2 Key, of course, to this conclusion is the fact
that both the receipt and the rescission occurred within
the same taxable year. Absent this the IRS would have
been bound to honor the sanctity of the taxable year thus
causing the employees to have year one income which
could only be adjusted in the later year of rescission.53
50 §83(b)(2).
5t Consent to revoke the election will be granted only in the case
where the transferee "is under a mistake of fact as to the underlying
transaction..." Reg. § 1.83-2(f).See. LTR 8313088 in which revocatior
was denied since the taxpayer's erroneous beliefs bort upon the abilit)
to value the stock rather than a mistake of fact as to the underlyin
transaction.
52 Since the aock transfer was disregarded so, too, were the 83(b:
elections (thus permitting to IRS to sidestep the alternative reques
for relief that the employees be permitted to revoke their §83(b
elections).
53 See. e.g, Rev. RuL 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181. 182 (%_the annua
accounting period principle requir[s] the determination of incom
at the close of the taxable year without regard to subsequent events-)
LETTER RULING REVIEW
November, 1990
IRS WITHDRAWS POSITION
THAT JOB PLACEMENT IS NOT
WORKING CONDITION FRINGE
Fairly recently (LTR 8913008) the Service concluded
that job placement assistance is not a tax-free working
condition fringe. In a plan to reduce the number of
employees the employer provided laid-off employees
with two options: (i) all cash severance pay (with the
total amount being measured by the length of the
employee's service, and (ii) one-half the cash the
employee would have received under (i) above, plus
intense outplacement counseling service (career direc-
tion, job search strategies, interview training, etc.).
Not working condition fringe. To be tax free as a
"working condition fringe" the property or service must
be of a type which, if paid for by the employee, the
amount paid would be deductible as a business expense
under § 162. At first blush one might conclude that clas-
sification as a working condition fringe should be rela-
tively easy since job seeking expenses have been held to
be deductible.17 The authority approving a deduction in
such instances is, though, based upon the notion that the
taxpayer in seeking new employment is carrying on the
trade or business of being, for example, a corporate
executive (Primuth) or an engineer (Kenfield). It is the
position of the Service that job seeking expenses are
deductible if the taxpayer is seeking employment in the
same trade or business in which he has been working but
that they are not deductible if employment in a new or
different trade or business is sought. For job seeking
expenses to be deductible, therefore, the taxpayer is seen
as acting in his trade or business, as distinct from the
taxpayer's trade or business of being an employee of the
employer.Is It was this distinction which provided the
basis for the IRS to deny working condition fringe status
to job placement assistance. The regulations specifi-
cally exclude amounts from working condition fringe
classification if the amount, if paid by the taxpayer, would
have been incurred in "other than the employee's trade
or business of being an employee of the employer." The
IRS concluded that working condition fringe status
should be denied since the taxpayeris, in seeking employ-
ment, no longer acting as an employee., but furthering
his own prospects in his trade in the larger sense.
IRS backs off. Even though the Service's position
has a patina of technical correctness about it, its seeming
harshness may have been what prompted, in LTR
9040025, its announcement that the adverse holding in
LTR 8913008 was being withdrawn. The IRS stopped
short of actually reversing itself, simply saying the issue
was being studied. One thing is clear, however, even if
job placement aid is held to be tax free under § 132, the
details of the plan in LTR 8913008 will have to be
reworked. The IRS states in LTR 9040025 that an option
to receive either all cash or cash and job placement
assistance will not pass muster since the IRS will view
the taxpayer, regardless of choice, as in constructive
receipt of the cash.
17 See. e.g. David J. Primh, 54 T.C. 374 (1970); Kenned R.
Kenfleld, 54 T.C. 1197 (1970). See, also. Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1
C.B. 55.
'a In fact, in Rev. Rul. 75-120. in which the IRS conceded deduc-
tibility of job seeking expenses, it is noted that the -IRS relied on the
familiar principle that an employee is engaged in the business of
providing services to various employers, not merely in the business
of working for his or her current employer." Biuker and LAkkcn,
Federal Taxation of Income. Estates and Gifts, p. 20-89 (2nd Ed.).
9 Reg. §1 .132-5T(a)(2).
LETTER RULING REVIEW
March, 1991
IRS FINDS PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FOR PHYSICAL INJURY
TAXABLE BUT INCORRECTLY
IGNORES 1989 AMENDMENT
In its ruling policy the IRS conforms to the same view
it follows in its litigation policy, to-wit, that punitive
damages for conduct resulting in personal injury are not
within the exclusion for damages for personal injury
provided for by §104(a)(2).' Thus, in LTR 9106013 the
Service concluded that the plaintiff, in a suit for injuries
due to employment-related exposure to asbestos, had
taxable income to the extent that the award was at-
tributable to punitive damages.
IRS ignores effect of 1989 statutory change. In 1989
Congress amended, prospectively only, §104(a)(2) to
provide that the exclusion did not apply to punitive
damages in connection with a case not involving physical
injury or physical sickness.2 Because the damages in-
volved in LTR 9106013 were pursuant to a suit filed
prior to that date, the IRS blithely brushed aside any
impact the 1989 amendment might have had on the issue.
Instead it leaped on Comm. v. Miller3 which recently
blessed the Service's administrative stance on this issue.
4
1 The IRS has not always viewed punitive damages as not within
the §104(a)(2) exclusion. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47, held that
such amounts were within the statute which excludes "any damages
received..on account of personal injuries or sickness" (Emphasis
in revenue ruling.) This position was withdrawn in Rev. Rut. 84-108,
1984-2 C.B. 32.
2 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. Law 101-239,
7641(a), effective for amounts received after July 10, 1989. unless
pursuant to a suit filed prior to that date or subject to a binding
agreement or decree prior thereto.
' 914 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1990), re'g. 93 T.C. 330 (1989).
4 In doing so it found that the -on account or language in 104(a)
does suggest causation but not necessarfly "but-for" causation it
could just as easily be., the court stated, "sufficient" causation (i.Ye.,
the plaintiff has to show egregious conduct by the defendant in order
to receive punitive damages and not simply personal injury alone).
Finding the statute ambiguous Miller based its conclusion that puni-
tive damages were taxable on the notion that punitive damages are
not compensation for damages but an amount received 'over and
above" a compensatory award.
Miller, which involved punitive damages received in 2
defamation suit. also finessed the effect of the 1989
amendment, simply noting in a footnote that the "[glover
nment concedes that the amendment does not apply tc
the case at bar." Naturally the Service would rush tc
assert the irrelevance of the 1989 amendment thinking
that it carries with it the implication that Congress fell
that punitive damages for physical injury (which wa
what was involved in LTR 9006013) were excludable
Why would Congress have limited its amendment taxing
punitive damages to those received as a result of non.
physical injury unless it intended that punitive damage,
for physical injury be excludable? There is much, in the
way of inference, to draw from the 1989 amendment anc
the fact that it is pro-taxpayer explains the government'.
ready willingness to assign the 1989 legislative change
toirrelevance.6 Thus the taxpayerto whomLTR910601
was issued should by no means settle for the determina
tion reached by the Service in that documenL?
914 F.2d at 588, n. 4.
6 Oddly the taxpayer in the Miller appeal did not assert the
relevance of the 1989 amendment to § 104(a)(2). If Congress had to
amend the statute to provide for the taxation of punitive damages
received as a result of non-physical injury, does not that action carry
the strong inference that punitive damages received in such a case
before the amendment's effective date are not taxable?
7 The conclusion that punitive damages were excludable under
§104(a)(2) appears to remain the view of a majority of the Tax Cour.
See. Bonnie A. Miller. 93 T.C. 330 (1989). a reviewed opinion.
LETTER RULING REVIEW
December, 1990
DEBTOR SPARED DEBT
CANCELLATION INCOME IN
SETTLEMENT OF OFFSETTING
CLAIMS
If the cancellation of indebtedness is accomplished by
some other form of payment the tax consequences which
befall the taxpayer whose debt is canceled occur outside
of cancellation of debt concepts. 10 This does not mean
that the taxpayer whose debt is canceled does not have
income-it simply means that the income takes another
form. For example, if the debtor obtains cancellation of
a debt through the performance of services, that taxpayer
has personal service income rather than income from the
cancellation of income. Similarly, if appreciated property
is transferred in cancellation of debt the debtor/taxpayer
would have gain realization from the transfer of property
(although if the appreciated property is worth less than
the amount of the debt the taxpayer could have both gain
realization and debt cancellation income). I Or, as LTR
9043027 points out, the taxpayer whose debt is canceled
may have no income if the taxpayer's recovery takes the
form of recovery of capital.
Debtor has claim against creditor for breach of
contract The brokerage firm with whom the taxpayer
had an account had a claim against the taxpayer for a
balance due on that account. As can often happen in such
cases the taxpayer asserted that the brokerage firm made
misrepresentations. If settlement negotiations lead to can-
cellation of the firm's claim for balance due, the issue
arises whether the taxpayer has debt cancellation income
and, if not, whether income in any other form is realized.
In these conflicting claims situations the Service views
the debtor as having transferred his claim for mis-
representation in return for cancellation of the debt al-
legedly owed by the taxpayer to the firm. 12 Or, put
another way, the taxpayer/debtor is regarded as having
received an amount in satisfaction of the misrepresenta-
tion claim which in turn is used to satisfy the firm's
claimed indebtedness. 13 However, even though the tax-
payer does not have debt cancellation income, there may
be receipt of income of another type. For example, if the
debtor/taxpayer's claim was based upon lost profits 14 the
constructive receipt of the damaged -amount would con-
stitute income in that form. In LTR 9043027, on the other
hand, the recovery for misrepresentation was viewed as
a capital recovery with the result that not only did the
taxpayer not have debt cancellation income, he had no
income at all.15
10Thus, for example, no opportunity would exist to exclude., per
108 (at the price of a basis adjustment), the debt cancellation from
income.
II See, Reg. §I.I001-2(a)(2), (cX8), Ex. 8; Rev. Rul. 90- 16.
1990.8 LR.B. 5.
t2 Thus, the debtor/taxpayer is viewed as having "paid" the debt
by giving up his misrepresentation claim.
3 E-9- Rev. Rul. 84-176, 1984-2 CB. 34.
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1XEMPT PROPERTY NOT
"ONSIDERED IN MEASURING
NSOLVENCY THEREBY
NCREASING 108 EXCLUSION
Under §§ 108(a) and (b), die amount that would other-
wise be debt discharge income is excluded from gross
ncome and is, instead, applied in reduction of various of
he taxpayer's tax attributes if the discharge occurs in a
mnkruptcy proceeding or when the taxpayer is insol-
ient.1 If the taxpayer is not actually in bankruptcy the
unount of the § 108 exclusion from gross income (if it is
o be) depends upon the extent to which the taxpayer is
nsolvent. The amount which is excluded per
108(a)(1)(B) may not exceed the amount by which the
axpayer is insolvent.2 Since "insolvent" is defined3 in
he traditional manner (i.e. the excess of liabilities over
'he fair market value of assets) it becomes important
,especially when individual taxpayers are involved) to
ocus on the precise manner in which this calculation is
made. This brings into play, and it is this issue which
LTR 9125010 addresses, the extent to which property
.xempt from the claims of creditors under local law is
iot a part of the insolvency calculation.
"Freeing of assets" doctrine involved. The rationale
for the insolvency exception to income inclusion from
4Jebt cancellation (now codified in §108(a)(1)(B)) is
'hat where no assets are freed from the claims of
:reditors, no income is realized. Thus, it follows that
only assets subject to the claims of creditors should be
ased to determine insolvency. 5 Quite naturally, in
'§§l08(aXIXA). (B).
2 §108(a)(3).
3 § 108(d)(3).
4 Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980. Pub. Law No. 96-589, 1980-2
'.B. 607; for legislative history, see. 1980-2 C.B. 620.
5 Marcus Estate. T.C. Memo. 1979-5.
making a determination concerning what property is ex-
empt. state law controls. Assume, for example, that the
taxpayer at the time of discharge of indebtedness6 has
$100x in liabilities and $60x in assets. Absent the exist-
ence of property exempt from the claims of creditors the
cap on the amount which could be excluded from in-
come per §108 would be $40x. If, though, the taxpayer
possesses property which is exempt from the claims of
creditors (usually, as respects real property, this will take
the form of a homestead exemption although some min-
imal amount of personal property is usually also eligible
for exemption), the calculation is altered in favor of a
greater § 108 exclusion. Thus, if the taxpayer's assets
include property with a value of $10x that is exempt
from creditors undei local law, liabilities would exceed
assets by $50x ($100x less $50x), thereby resulting in an
increase in the amount which could be excluded from
income by reason of §108.! Sinc LTR 9125010 plainly
blesses removing exempt property from the insolvency
calculation, individual taxpayers faced with discharge
income should not overlook the relevance of the local
law exemptions.
6 The amount by which the taxpayer is insolvent (and, hence. the
limit on the § 108 exclusion) shall be determined on the basis of assets
and liabilities immediately before the discharge. § 108(d)(3).
7 The level of exemption is going to vary considerably among the
seveal states. Cf.. Texas law described in C. L. Hunt. T.C. Memo.
1989-335 (generally exempting the FMV of improvements on the
property plus $ 10,000 of the value of the land but liens are deducted
first from the nonexempt portion in determining the total exemption
amount) with the relatively small $30.000 homestead exemption
accorded by Washington state (R.C.W. 6.13.030).
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INCOME GENERATED BY
ABANDONMENT MAY BE
PARTLY ELIGIBLE FOR
EXCLUSION UNDER §108
It is not infrequent for a homeowner in a dire financial
situation to simply walk away from an encumbered
residence when a negative equity exists. There is little
doubt, of course, that such an abandonment constitutes a
gain realization to the abandoning taxpayer. An atten-
dant question is, however, whether a taxpayer in such a
situation can exclude the gain under §108 where the
taxpayer finds himself in bankruptcy (which can often be
the case in such situations).
Residence had an FMV less than the amount of the
mortgages. In LTR 9120010 the taxpayers walking
away from their residence were debtors in a case under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. It seems plain that
in such a situation the amount realized from the aban-
donment of the residence would consist of the FMV of
the transferred residence and cancellation of debt (COD)
income to the extent the indebtedness exceeds the FMV
of the residence. See, Reg.§ 1.1001-2(c), Ex. 8.11 Does
this same bifurcation apply in determining the scope of
§ 108(a)(1)(A) (which excludes COD income from gross
income where the discharge occurs in a Title 11 case)? 12
The Service quickly concluded that § 108 excludability
applies only to COD income and not to that portion
which might be viewed as garden variety gain realiza-
tion. Thus, if a taxpayer abandons a residence having an
original cost of $75,000 and a FMV of $85,000 but
subject to a $100,000 debt,13 "garden variety" gain
recognition will occur in the amount of $10,000 (the
excess of the FMV over basis). At the same time COD
income will be realized in the amount of $15,000 (the
excess of the debt over FMV) which will be potentially
eligible for exclusion under § 108.14
In example 8 in the regulation the taxpayer was found to have
$1,500 in COD income where the property abandoned had an FMV
of $6.000 and was subject to a recourse mortgage of $7,500 (the
amount realized being the $6,000 FMV of the residence and COD
income which equaled the excess of the debt over the residence's
FMV).
12 Ile price for such an exclusion is a reduction of tax attributes
to the extent provided in §108(b).
13 In order for the debt to exceed basis its is most likely that the
aggregate debt includes both acquisition debt and a second en-
cumbrance, the funds from which were used for other purposes.
14 See, Rev. Rul. 90-16, 1990-1 C.B. 12.
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Due To Lack Of Regs IRS Refuses
To Exclude Related Party Debt From
Amount At-Risk
In 1978 Congress extended the at-risk rules (§465)
to each activity engaged in by the taxpayer in carrying
on a trade or business from their prior more limited
scope. §465(c)(3). The relationship between this
broader scope and §465(b)(3), which provides that
amounts borrowed shall not be considered at risk if
such amounts are borrowed from a person who has an
interest in the activity or from a "related person," is the
subject of LTR 9132004. A partnership, which owned
freight barges on the Mississippi, had an arrangement
by which the actual operation of the barges (schedul-
ing, fueling, maintenance, etc.) was carried on by a
closely-held corporation owned by the individuals who
were also the partners in the partnership. The partner-
ship, which operated at a loss, received considerable
financial support from the closely-held corporation
which treated such advances as debits against it collec-
tion of barge fees and, to the extent not covered by that
source, as amounts owing from the partnership. Al-
though the relationship between the corporation and
the partnership might have warranted not including
such amounts in the partners' at-risk amounts, the IRS,
taking a cue from Charles F. Alexander, 95 T.C. 476
(1990), refused to exclude related party debt from the
at-risk base because of the absence of regulations
under §465(b)(3).
LETTER RULING REVIEW
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INSTALLMENT TREATMENT
OF CASINO WINNINGS NOT
FOILED BY STANDBY LETTER
OF CREDIT
Many casinos, lotteries and sweepstakes make pay-
met of their prize amounts in annual installments rather
than though a lump sum. The acceptability of such an
arrangement is enhanced if the promise to pay by install-
ment is supported by security of some type. If this is
done the issue arises whether the existence of security
for the promise compels a conclusion that the individual
is taxed on the full amount pursuant to the economic
benefitdoctrine. 6 In LTR 9043014 the casino purchased
s6The economic benefit doctrine (for which Comm. v. Smith, 324
U.. 177 (1945) is usually cited) has application in a nonemployment
context as well For example, in Stephen W. PuLrifer. 64 T.C. 238
(1975), the prize amount, irrevocably deposited with a court because
of the winner's minority and not actually available until placed with
a guardian or until the winner reached majority, was held to be
immediately taxable. See, also,JosephAnastazio, 67 T.C. 814 (1977),
involving lottery winnings, reaching the same result. See, also, Rev.
RuL 62-74, 1962-1 C.B. 68; Rev. Rid. 67-203, 1967-1 C.B. 105.
a standby letter of credit for each winner in an amount
equal to the aggregate amount of the deferred jackpot
payments due that winner. Stressing that no amounts
would actually be set aside by the casino (in trust or in
an escrow, for example), 7 and that the individual winner
did not have a choice as to how the payments were
made,58 the IRS ruled that the payments would have to
be included in income only as received.5 9 Like so much
in the tax law the IRS has to be sure that a concession
in one area does not come back to haunt them in another.
In LTR 9043014, therefore, the IRS rushes to admonish
that its conclusion therein does not soften its stance that
the presence of security for a promise to pay in a com-
pensatory context will result in the receipt of property
for purposes of §8360
57 This, in the Service's view, compels immediate taxation. Rev.
Rul. 62-74, 1962-1 C.B. 68.
59 If such choice existed it would be the Service's position that
the taxpayer was in constructive receipt of total winnings.
59See LTR 8923020 reaching a similarresultregarding installment
payments of a prize secured by a surety bond.
60 Reg. §1.83-3(e), which defines property, for purposes of the
restricted property rules, as encompassing a promise to pay which is
either funded or secured. Note that in LTR 9043014 the casino used
its funds to purchase the letter of credit without affecting a favorable
result for the individual taxpayer. In an employment context it is
necessary for the security to be obtained at the employee's expense
if the restricted property rules are to be avoided. E.g. LIR 8406012.
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BUYER'S PREPAYMENT OF IN-
STALLMENTS NOT GROUNDS
FOR 453 ELECTION OUT
Once a return is filed reporting income from the sale
of property on the installment method it is well nigh
impossible for the seller to later make a decision to elect
out. 19 In times of downward rate fluctuation taxpayers
may be enticed into adopting the installment method
(i.e.. not electing out) in the hope that future payments
will be taxed at the lower rates existing when the pay-
ments are received (it being a given that the rate level
existing at the time of the receipt of the installment
applies in determining the tax impact). The danger.
though, is that the success of the seller's objective lies
fully in the hands of the purchaser if the right toprepay
exists (as it most often will). In LTR 9121044 the seller.
making a 1986 sale (the year preceding a significant
downturn in tax rates) was lulled into believing that the
overall gain would be taxed at the lower future rates by
the buyer's assurance that he would not dispose of the
property during the 10-year installment period. Instead,
however, the buyer sold the property in 1987 and paid
off in full the balance due the seller. The taxpayer/seller,
thinking that full income inclusion in 1986 was
preferable (there may have deductions to which the tax-
payer was entitled in that year) sought permission to
elect out.20 Hewing to its hard line that such eaission
will be granted only in "rare circumstances" the IRS,
noting that there never was an intent to adopt any method
other than the installment method, swiftly concluded that
the buyer's prepayment (unexpected though it was) was
no ground for a subsequent election out. The buyer's
right to prepay truly does put the tax impact to the seller
in the buyer's hands.
19 Although it is difficult to switch from an election out to use of
the installment method after the return is filed it is probably even
more difficult to alter a decision made not to elect out after §453 was
used on an initially filed return. See, "Is IRS Now Requiring Written
Documentation Regarding Initial Intent When 453 Revocation Is
Sought?." Letter Ruling Review, Dec. 1990. p. 6 .
20 An election out of the installment method must be made on or
before the due date of the return for the taxable year in which the sale
occurred. §453(d)(2); Reg. §15A.453-1(d)(3)(i).
21 Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(3)(ii). 28
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TAXPAYERS CAN SIDESTEP
CAPITALIZATION OF
CONTRACT TERMINATION
PAYMENTS AND DEDUCT
CURRENTLY
One of the continuing dilemmas in the tax law-no
matter how much the statute changes--is the line be-
tween capital expenditure and deductible business ex-
pense. One of the areas in which this can arise is when
payments are made in termination of contract rights. For
example, it seems settled that amounts paid by a lessor to
cancel a lease (i.e., remove the lessee from the premises
so that a more advantageous lease arrangement can be
entered into) constitute a nondeductible capital expendi-
ture.L5 The opposite seems to be true, however, when a
payment is made by a lessee to cancel a lease; such a
payment would be eligible for current deductibility. LTR
9123004 sheds considerable light on the litmus that the
IRS will apply in drawing the line.
Payments made to be relieved from contract to
purchase. The taxpayer, a utility company, had entered
into an agreement whereby it was to purchase 7.7 million
tons of an unnamed product (coal?) at the rate of $40,000
a month over the period beginning July 1981 and ending
September 1997. A termination provision permitted the
buyer pay a fee of $3 per ton for the amount remaining to
be purchased at the time of the notice of termination. In
1984 the taxpayer, because it could purchase the product
at a lower price on the spot market and because its
requirements were less, paid $20.2 million in termina-
tion of the contract and sought to deduct such amount as
an ordinary and necessary business expense under § 162.
Two aspects of the termination caused a potential prob-
lem with deductibility---the fact that the termination
agreement gave the taxpayer the right to purchase further
amounts at the "current contract price" and the
taxpayer's statement to shareholders that even if cus-
tomers bore the cancellation costs (and the taxpayer felt
they should) they would still have a "significant net
savings over the 13-year period."1 6 Viewing the tax-
payer as "reaping benefits in future years by terminating
the...contract," the IRS took the position on audit that the
termination amounts should be amortized over the 13-
year period.
Is The motion is that in such a situation the lessor "receives back
rights to its underlying asset which presumably will produce future
benefits."
16 The 13 years ran from the date of cancellation (1984) to the
termination of the original contract (1997).
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PARTNERSHIPS CAN'T BE
AGGREGATED FOR AT-RISK
RULES
The concept of what constitutes a "trade or business"
permeates the tax law. In most instances, however, the
issue is whether the taxpayer's activity rises to the level
of a "trade or business" or is, for example, simply an
investment activity. 10 In LTR 9035005. however, the
issue was not whether the activity was a trade or business
but whether the activities carried on by the taxpayer were
separate trades or businesses. Although the at-risk rules
(§4652 are clearly made applicable to "each" listed ac-
tivity there is, in §465(c)(3)(B), some room for ag-
gregation of nonlisted activities "which constitute a trade
or business." 12 The advantage of aggregation is obvious
and is demonstrated by the desire of the taxpayer in LTR
9035005 to aggregate the negative at-risk amount at-
tributable to his 50% interest in an oil and gas partnership
t0 See. e.g. Boyle, "What is a Trade or Business?," 39 The Tax
Lawyer 737 (1986).
11 §465(c)(2)(A).
12 Nonlisted activities, for purposes of §465, are activitics other
than holding, producing, ordistributing motion picture films or video
tapes, farming, leasing § 1245 property, and exploring for. or exploit-
ing. oil and gas property or geothermal deposits. 'ece §465(c)(I).
with the positive amount at-risk attributable to his 50%
interest in a partnership operating restaurant properties,
which would have resulted in a sufficient amount at risk
in the combined activity to deduct all of his distributive
share of losses from the oil and gas partnership.
Aggregation of partnership activities okay. It was
not the fact that the taxpayer sought to aggregate the
activities of two separate partnerships that caused the
problem. If the taxpayer actively participates in the
management of the partnership activity (which this tax-
payer did) the taxpayer's share of the amounts at-risk of
more than one partnership can properly be aggregated. 13
The point stressed in LTR 9035005, and which resulted
in an adverse result for the taxpayer, is that aggregation
is available only for activities "which constitute a trade
or business" (emphasis supplied), meaning, the IRS says,
a single trade or business. The legislative history leaves
the door wide open for the aggregation of the real estate
activities of more than one partnership(as long, ofcourse,
as the taxpayer actively participates in the real estate
activity of each partnership sought to be aggregated). 14
The taxpayer in LTR 9035005 thus hoped to prompt a
successful inquiry into whether the two partnerships
were, in fact, engaged in the same business. The IRS
adroitly sidestepped such an inquiry by observing that
the activities carried on by the two partnerships could
not be a single trade or business since one was a cash
method taxpayer and the other accrual. 15 The illuminat-
ing aspect of this letter ruling is the Service's tight con-
struction of "which constitute a trade or business" as
mandating that aggregation apply only to amounts at risk
within a single trade or business.
'' §465(c)(3)(B) permits aggregation of nonlistd activities, con-
stituting a trade or business, if the taxpayer actively participates in
the management of such trade or business, or, if such trade or business
is carried on by a partnership or an S corporation. 65% or more of
the losses of such are allocable to persons who actively participate
in the management of the trade or business.
14 S. Rept. No. 313.99th Cong.. 2nd Sess. 750 (1986), (reprinted
at 1986-3 (Vol. 3) C.B. 750).
15 The Service noted that under §446(d) a taxpayer is permitted
to use separate methods of accounting only if the taxpayer is engaged
in separate and distinct trades or businesses and keeps separate books
and records. Even if the taxpayer had not been "hung" by reason of
the adoption of separate accounting methods, it would seem that
aggregation of the oil and gas at-risk amounts with Those of the
restaurant activity would have been difficult since the.former is a
"listed" activity (and §465(c)(3)(B) sems to permit aggregation only
of nonlisted activities constituting a single trade or business). The
taxpayer's hope would have been to classify both as engaged in the
real estatc business, a road which would have been difficult in tile
best of circumstances but which here was made impassable by the
30 difference in methods( of accounting.
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Fact that termination payments did not result in
an identifiable asset is not determinative. One might
have thought this would be a significant factor. Instead,
the IRS adopts another litmus-whether the payments
produce future income (in which case they must be capi-
talized) or whether they are designed to reduce costs (in
which case they may be expensed). 17 Looked at closely
in such a situation is whether, as a result of the termina-
tion, the taxpayer acquired a right which could create
future income. True. here the taxpayer did acquire the
right to purchase further quantities of the product but
such subsequent purchases were to be at the spot price-
no great advantage.lS
17 This line seems to have been drawn by the Tax Court in
Rodeway Inns of America, 64 T.C. 404 (1974), in which the court
mequired capitalization of amounts paid by a hotel franchiser to ter-
minate a franchisee's exclusive rights in a particular tcrritory (on the
notion that the agreement canceled provided the taxpayer with the
opportunity to augment its income in the territory). In making this
distinction the Tax Court blessed the deductibility of payments, the
purpose of which was -to reduce or eliminate its losses or expenses."
18 In reaching its decision the IRS ignored the taxpayer-utlity's
effort to justify passing the cost on the customers over the 13-year
period in the future as so much corporate bluster.
LETTER RULING REVIEW
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INTEREST ON INSTALLMENT
SALE CONTRACTS INHERITED
BY SUCCESSOR PARTNERSHIP
AVOIDS PORTFOLIO LABEL
The treatment of income as "portfolio" will block
using losses from a passive activity as an offset. In a
ruling context, therefore, the IRS will frequently "bob
and weave" and avoid, if it can, assuring taxpayers that
income constitutes passive activity income against
which PALs can be used. 16 A common question regard-
ing a business would be whether interest, which is
generally portfolio, 17 received by it in its business ac-
tivity is portfolio or whether, because of its business
nexus, it can escape that classification. Generally speak-
ing, interest derived in the ordinary course of business is
not portfolio. is The regulations treat interest received on
customer accounts as "derived in the ordinary course of
a trade or business" if "credit is customarily offered to
customers of the business." 19 If property is sold by a
partnership pursuant to installment contracts in the ordi-
nary course of its business the question can arise whether
14 See. §674(b)(5)(A). relating to corpus, and § 674(d). relating to
income.
'
5 Reg. § 1.674(d)-2(a).
16 See. e.g., "Limited Partnership's Income Is 'Portfolio' Thus
Blocking PAL Offset," Letter Ruling Review, June 1990, p. 1.
17 §469(e)(1)(A); reg. § 1.469-2T(c)(3)(i).
I8 See, §469(e)(1)(A)(i)(1), which specifically provides that inter-
est "derived in the ordinary course of a trade or business" is not
portfolio.
" Reg. § 1.469-2T(c)(3)(ii)(B).
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interest on those contracts would have the same status
(presumably not portfolio income) if that atership
"'merged" into another successor partnership. 0 It is this
issue which LTR 9116029 addresses.
2 1
Partnership sells office condominium suites on in-
stallment plan. Subsequent to these sales the partner-
ship, a general partnership, "merged" into a limited
partnership, raising the issue of the status of the interest
received on the installment notes (now held by the
limited partnership). The most the IRS would do is to
conclude that the interest income received by the limited
partnership on the contracts inherited by it were not
portfolio but income derived by the successor partner-
ship in the ordinaryourse of the successor partnership's
trade or business. Thus, the surviving partnership is
not considered to hold the sales contracts as portfolio-
type investments but as assets acquired in an ordinary
trade or business context. 3 This holding would, there-
fore, seem to open the way for interest on the prior sales
contracts to be taken into consideration in determining
the limited partners' gains or losses from the partnership
activity.
4
20 Pursuant to §708(b)(2)(A), if two or more partnerships merge
the resulting partnership is treated as a continuation of any merging
partnership whose members own more than 50 percent of the capital
and profits of the resulting partnership. While other partnerships are
considered terminated the partners of such partnerships are less likely
to realize gain as a result of actual cash distributions because no
actual cash is treated as distributed to them (although they be more
likely to realize gain as a result of constructive §752(b) distributions).
See, McKee, Nelson & Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partners and
Partnerships, para. 12.06(11] (2nd. Ed. 1990).
21 Although the installment method is not available for disposi-
tions by dealers after 1987 (§453(b)(2)(A)), the issue involved herein
could arise with respect to pre-1988 dispositions or with respect to
accounts receivable of the prior partnership. See, Reg. §1.469-
2T(c)(3)(ii)(B).
The IRS specifically withheld ruling on whether the partner-
ship merger resulted in a disposition of the activity such as would
bring §469(g) into play.
23 This is, of course, consistent with the tax-free treatment nor-
mally accorded partnership "mergers." LTR 9116029 appears, how-
ever, to make no distinction between partnerships that terminate as a
result of the merger and those that (pursuant to §708(b)(2)(A)) do
not. Thus, it would appear that the IRS would reach the same con-
clusion even if the partners of the transferring partnership realized
gain, by reason of the termination of the transferring partnership, as a
result of the merger. See note 20, supra.
24 If the limited partner's share resulted in a gain it would most
likely be treated as a passive activity gain against which PALs could
be offset. See §469(h)(2).
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Timber Owner's §631 Gain Caused
By 'Hugo' Eligible For §1033
When property is involuntarily converted the realiza-
tion of gain is most frequently attributable to the
receipt of insurance proceeds. The gain so realized can
avoid recognition if the taxpayer purchases property
"similar or related in service and use" within the re-
quired time period. §§ 1033(a)(2)(A), (B). Timber
destroyed by a casualty event (e.g., Hurricane Hugo)
presents an unusual opportunity as LTR 9131034
demonstrates. Frequently, since large timber holdings
will not be insured against such a calamity there will
not be the conversion into cash as when insurance is
present. There is, nevertheless, compelled gain recogni-
tion to the timberholder if an election has been made
under §631 to treat the cutting of timber as the sale or
exchange of that asset. Since most large timberholders
will have made such an election (in order to obtain the
capital gain treatment) the question arises whether
§631 gain (measured by the excess of the FMV of the
cut tree over its basis) can be sheltered by reinvestment
in the requisite replacement property. LTR 9131034
answers this issue favorably to the taxpayer by conclud-
ing that § 1033 provides nonrecognition "[r]egardless
of whether the realization of gain or loss arises
from...the cutting of timber under §63 l(a)...or actual
sales..." The § 1033 reinvestment period will begin to
run in the year in which Hugo is deemed to have
resulted in the taxable event. Thus, since there may not
be an immediate conversion of the toppled trees into
salable logs, other sources of funds may have to be
used for the reinvestment. All that is fine and, as LTR
9131034 further announces, expenditures for reforesta-
tion, cleaning and clearing drainage systems, repairing
fences, gates and roads, all qualify as reinvestment in
property which is "similar or related in service and
use."
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had discretion to make distributions to the trustors
("care, maintenance and support") was limited by a
reasonable standard. 14 All this.might have been suffi-
cient to avoid §674(a) but for the fact that the trustors
also possessed the right to remove or replace (in the
event of vacancy) the trustee. This was enough to render
the exceptions to §674(a) inapplicable thus causing the
trustors to be treated as owners of the trust. 15 If this was
unwelcome news it at least carried with it a positive
result when the trust sold the residence--he § 121 ex-
clusion could be used.
FOR §121 TO BE AVAILABLE
FOR RESIDENCE IN TRUST
GRANTOR TRUST PROVISIONS
MUST APPLY
When creating an irrevocable trust in which the setnlor
is a lifetime beneficiary, care must be taken to walk the
narrow line provided for by §674 and avoid having the
settlor treated as the owner of the trust (with the result, of
course, that the income from the trust would be taxed to
the settlor, or -trustor," to use the Service's term). If this
is the objective it should be one which can be easily
obtained but one should be mindful that the §121 ex-
clusion would be foregone if a primary residence is part
of the trust's corpus. Avoidance of the grantor trust
provisions necessarily results in abandonment of the
one-time exclusion of gain from the sale of primary
residences for taxpayers over age 55. The result is, of
course, based on the notion that ownership of the
residence by the trust precludes treating the beneficiary
as realizing gain from the disposition of a primary
residence (even though it is still being occupied by the
beneficiary and would plainly be treated as a -primary
residence"). 13
Irrevocability not enough. In LTR 9118017 it
would seem that taxpayers (husband and wife) did
everything they could to insure compliance with the
exceptions to §674 and thereby avoid being treated as
owners of the trust (which included their residence
which they were entitled to use). The trustees were inde-
pendent of the trustors and the standard by which they
12 1971-2 C.B. 347.
13 See, Rev. Rul. 85-45, 1985-1 C.B. 183; also. Rev. Rul. 66-159,
1966-1 C.B. 162 (reaching the same conclusion with respect to
qualification for tax-free rollover under § 1034)
LETTER RULING REVIEW
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IRS WRESTLES WITH 1033
QUALIFICATION WHEN
PROCEEDS INVESTED
IN IMPROVEMENTS ON
RETAINED PROPERTY
In applying nonrecognition provisions most would
view the "Like-kind" standard for defining replacement
property as broader than "similar or related in service
and use." Thus, normally taxpayers replacing con-
demned property, and seeking nonrecognition under
§ 1033, are most likely to obtain their objective pursuant
to §1033(g). 4 1 This would permit taxpayers to replace
condemned undeveloped real property with real property
that is developed (or the other way around). Curiously,
though, the "similar or related in service and use" stand-
ard is broader than "like-kind" when the taxpayer seeks
to use the condemnation award to improve property al-
ready held by the taxpayer.
Bringing retained property up to pre-condemna-
tion use should qualify. In LTR 9118007 the con-
demned property was undeveloped except for some
preliminary improvements for construction of a
residence (which objective had since been abandoned).
The taxpayer's request to treat investment in improve-
ments to a farm (on which he lived) or to a subdivision
thereof as qualifying "like-kind" was denied on the basis
of the Service's position that improvements to other real
property held by the taxpayer failed like-kind equivalen-
40 One has to assume that an 1 ith hour abrogation of the cross-
purchase agreement may not render the gift tax inapplicable since
such a step would obviously have been taken solely for the purpose
of avoiding the gift tax impact.
41 This provision, which can apply when the property taken is
trade or business property or held for investment, brings the like-
kind standard of §1031 (see, Reg. §1.103 1(a)-l(b)) into play.
cy. 4 2 This result should' be contrasted with LTR
9117030 in which the condemnation resulted in one
portion of the retained property being severed from
another part, raising the issue of whether the use of the
condemnation proceeds for the construction of a bridge
connecting the two parcels would qualify for nonrecog-
nition. In response, in LTR 9117030, the IRS held the
bridge would qualify as "similar or related in service and
use," on the notion, apparently, that such expenditure
brought the property back to the level of its previous
utility. 3 When it is considered that such an expenditure
would not have qualified as like-kind, it can be seen that,
in the context of using the proceeds to improve retained
property, there is greater opportunity for nonrecognition
when the generally narrower standard is applied.
42 Rev. Rul. 67-255, 1967-2 C.B. 270. in which holds neither
construction of a new building, nor roads, water systems, etc., on
land already owned qualify as like-kind to land. This position, thatland is not of the same nature or character as a building or roads or a
water system, seems odd since it is readily conceded that un-developed land is "like-kind" to a building and land. Reg.§ . 103 t(a)- 1(b). If land is condemned reinvesutent in improvements
only, without land, is not, the IRS says, "like-kind."
43 The IRS relied on Rev. Rul. 67-254,1967-2 C.B. 269, in which
the Service found the taxpayer's use of the condemnation proceeds to
rebuild a truck garage which was formerly on the condemned proper-
ty to be eligible as "similar or related in ervice and use."
44For example, the taxpayer in LTR 9118007 might have been
entitled to "similar or related in service and use" treatment if the
proceeds had been used to install (on retained property) the same
kind of preliminary improvements as existed on the property taken.
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QUEST FOR SECURITY IN
DEFERRED 1031 EXCHANGE
MUST BE HANDLED NIMBLY
Very often in a §1031 exchange the two properties
are not transferred simultaneously because the replace-
ment property has not yet been identified. Quite often
the reason for this is because the "buyer" (the other party
to the exchange) needs the property before the taxpayer
has identified the property he wishes to exchange (or
before it becomes available). Although the famous
Starker case5 1 permitted a deferred exchange (the buyer
setting up an "exchange balance" for the taxpayer to be
used to acquire the replacement property once identified).
Congress, in 1984, limited the extent to which such
deferred exchanges could qualify for § 1031 nonrecogni-
tion.52
Taxpayers seek comfort of security from buyer. It
was all well and good for the taxpayer in Starker to have
accepted the "buyer's" unsecured promise to purchase
(utilizing the "exchange balance") replacement property
once identified, but in many contexts such a promise will
not provide the taxpayer with peace of mind to know
that the wherewithal will be there to acquire the replace-
ment property when necessary. When, as LTR 9052019
shows, as taxpayers begin to seek more satisfactory as-
surance, through various "security" devices, the potential
for trouble arises. Unfortunately, the taxpayers in LTR
9052019 were not nearly as imaginative as they ought
to have been. The cash proceeds from the sale were
placed in CDs (and a savings account) under the
"authority and control" of the taxpayers. Even though
the 45-day and 180-day requirements of §1031(a)(3)
were met (relating to the identification and acquisition,
respectively, of the replacement property) the IRS held
that the receipt of cash, or the equivalent thereof, resulted
in a failure to meet the "exchange" requirement of
§103. 53 In these days of regular use of the deferred
§ 1031 exchange approach, it now appears that"the prob-
lem of working out an adequate security arrangement
may be the rincipal impediment to a nonsimultaneous
exchange, a goal toward which the taxpayers fell
woefully short. t
It makes no difference whether the taxpayers actually received
the cash (as appears to have been the case in LTR 9052019 even
though it was received by a trust of which they we trustees and
beneficiaries) or whether they were in eonstrtive receipt of such
amounts. In either instance there would have been a liquidation and
a failure to engage in a tecipiocal transfer of property. Obviously.
therefore, the buyer's check will result in the receipt of the equivalent
of cash even though it is not deposited but is endorsed over to the
holder of the replacement property. Carroll M. Nixn, T.C. Memo.*
1987-318. The same problem arises with the use of escrow accounts.
See. e.g.. Maxwell v. US.. 88-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9560 (D.C. P/a.).
3 Bitlker & Lokken, Federal income Taxation of ijcome Estates
and G&. Vol. 2, p. 44-25.
55 Carefid planning can though, result in a much higher likelihood
of success than the taxpayers had in LTR 9052019. See. Cummings.
"How To Secure A Delayed Section 1031 Exchange," 70J. Tax. 230
(1989) (although the author concedes that "[I]here appears to be an
inverse relation between the taxpayer's financial security and tax
security").
50 E.g., to proceed with development plans.
51 Starker v. U.S., 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
52 See. §1O31(a)3) which provides (i) that the replacemtent
property must be identified within 45 days after the tapIayer's trans-
fer, and (ii) that the replacement property must be received no later
than 180 days after the taxpayer's tranfer (or. i earlier, the due
date of the taxpayer's return for the year of the transfer).
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IRS POSITIVE IN ALLOWING
EXPENSES FOR GRAD TAX
LAW STUDY
The prospect of deducting graduate education is very
alluring. Since it is so alluring it is quite likely that the
IRS will scrutinize a taxpayer's attempt to take it. Con-
sequently, there should be more than the usual interest in
the Service's ruling policy since from that one can go
some way in determining what is likely to be challenged
and why. Aside from the maxim that the education must
"maintain or improve"9 skills iequired in the taxpayer's
trade or business, the issues seem to be whether (i) the
taxpayer was actually engaged in the trade or business to
which the education relates, and (ii) if the education is
full-time, whether the taxpayer should be viewed as
having interrupted the business activity to an extent
where it would it would be proper to regard the taxpayer
5 See Reg. §25.251 1-l(h)(1) which stands for the proposition that
a transfer for the benefit of a corporation is regarded as a transfer to
the corporation itself and indirectly to the other shareholders of the
corporation.
6 Although not mentioned in LTR 9114023 it would seem that
this transfer would be considered a gift only to the extent that the
value transferred exceeds the taxpayer's own interest in the corpora-
tion. See, Reg. §25.251 l-I(h)(1).
7 Reg. §25.2512-8. This principle was the one cited in Rev. Rul.
80-196, 1980-2 C.B. 32, for holding that no gift was made when two
50 percent shareholders each transferred the same amount of stock to
key employees. Rev. Rut. 80-196 was distinguished in LTR 9114023
on the ground that in the former each shareholder received an offset-
ting benefit as a result of the other's transfer whereas in the latter the
taxpayer deemed to have made a gift was the only one transferring
stock.
8 §2503(b)-
9 Reg. §162-5(a)(1).
as no longer "carrying on" that business. Both of these
issues seem to be involved, as they were in LTR
9112003, when a lawyer goes off (either by resigning the
prior employment association or on a leave of absence
basis) to graduate school.
Taxpayer an associate in law firm. The taxpayer, a
spanking new law grad, began his association witfi a firm
in September 1986 (he was not admitted to the bar until
May 1987). In July 1990 he resigned the position to
pursue (full-time) a graduate degree in taxation. Clearly,
therefore, the IRS was not presented with a period of
time of prior involvement in the business activity that
was so short that one could say the taxpayer was not
really "carrying on" the business activity that is sup-
posed to be the basis of the deduction.t 0 Although the
IRS notes that "questions of federal tax law arose" in the
taxpayer's practice there is no indication he was spend-
ing even the majority of his time in that area. Thus, it is
possible to glean from LTR 9112003 that it is sufficient
that the taxpayer is simply practicing law and not
specializing. Moving from being a generalist in the law
to a specialist will not, it seems, result in the education
being the tainted "upward-bound" variety. Next, the
prospect of full-time education always raises the specter
that the taxpayer will be viewed as improperly breaking
the cord with the prior activity and hence not "carrying
on." Here, too, there was no problem since the nine-
month period of study fell within the one year guideline
the IRS previously established. 12 Consequently, even
the IRS concedes there should be few, if any, obstacles
to deductibility of expenses of graduate tax study if a
practicing lawyer leaves a firm to do so. But misfortune
would most certainly follow therecent law grad who
goes directly to graduate school after spending the sum-
mer followinggraduation on the beach or even working
in his father's business.
13
10 See, e.g., Ross Lawrence Link, 90 T.C. 460 (1988) in which the
Tax Court found that a summer's employment prior to enrolling in an
M.B.A. program was not sufficient. Cf-. Albert C. Ruelwmnn, T.C.
Memo. 1971-157. cited with approval in LTR 9112003, in which
employment for that period of time prior to enrolling in a graduate tax
program was sufficient.
11 See. e.g.. Bittker and Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income
Estates and Gifts. 1 221.3 (2nd Ed.).
12 Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 C.B. 73. The IRS has not always
been upheld on this attempted "bright-line." See, Bittker and Lokken.
Federal Taxation of Income Estates and Gifts, 22.1.5 (2nd Ed.).
13 E.g.. Pail R. Wassenaar. 72 T.C. 1195 (1979).
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IRS rules that subsequently transferred property
in divorce context eligible for treatment as property
settlement. The transfer of property "incident to a
divorce" is treated as a gift--tax-free to the recipient.
§ 104 1. To be eligible the transfer must occur within
one year after the date the marriage ceases or it must be
"related to the cessation of the marriage." § 1041(c). It
is not unusual for the parties to overlook, in the inten-
sity of negotiations, property in which marital interests
exist. In LTR 9123053 subsequent to the divorce it was
determined that the ex-wife had a community property
interest in her former husband's employment benefits.
After later negotiations it was agreed that the husband
would pay his former wife $X in installments over a 60-
month period (which. obviously, placed the payments
subsequent to the one year post-divorce period). Some
leeway is granted by the regulations (Reg. § 1.1041-IT,
Q&A 7) which provide that transfers occurring not
more than six years after the date on which the mar-
riage ceases will be treated as "related to cessation of
the marriage" if pursuant to a modification of the agree-
ment. Here, however, the payments stretched beyond
the six-year period and, therefore, a presumption ex-
isted that they were not made pursuant to the cessation
of the marriage. It is in rebuttal of thatpresumption
that the IRS ruled in LTR 9123053 that the payments
were "incident to divorce" under § 1041. Note that such
a f-mding was necessary (if tax-free treatment to the
recipient was to be insured) even though the IRS readi-,
ly conceded that the payments, subject an obligation
which was not conditioned upon the ex-wife being
alive for the 6 0-month period, were not alimony within§71(b).
LETTER RULING REVIEW
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TAX BURDEN ON 'RIPE'
STOCK SALE CAN BE SHIFTED
TO SPOUSE IF TRANSFER
INCIDENT TO DIVORCE
In the charitable area the IRS has always been vigilant
to insure that taxpayers contributing appreciated proper-
ty to charity are not successful in shuffling off, to the
charity, gain that would ordinarily be recognized by the
donor. Employing traditional assignment of income
principles most courts would conclude that income from
a contract for the sale of stock will be taxed to the donor
despite the fact that the sale is actually consummated
after the donation of the stock to charity.1 The question
boils down to whether the liquidation, or other means by
which the stock is to be disposed of, is "too ripe" to shift
the shareholder tax burden thereon.
Divorce decree provides for immediate redemp-
tion of stock from transferee spouse. In LTR 9046004
the husband was the president and majority shareholder
of a closely held corporation. Pursuant to the divorce
decree his ex-spouse was to receive a substantial portion
of the husband's interest in the corporate stock. Since
such an asset would provide almost no liquidity to the
transferee, and probably no income, it was provided that
the stock was to be immediately redeemed from her by
the corporation. 2 In view of the "ripeness" of the asset at
1 To a great extent the cases on this question flow from such old
assignment of income "chestnuts" as Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940) and Comm. v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
Many cases arose in the context of the charitable donation of stock in
a corporation which had already agreed to liquidate and concluded
that gain realization as a consequence of the liquidation distribution
must be taxed to the shareholder/donor. E.g., Hudspeth v. U.S.. 471
F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972); Jones v. U.S.. 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir.
1976). Rollins v. U.S., 302 F. Supp 812 (WiD. Tex. 1969).
2 The corporation's articles and by-laws provided that no
shareholder would sell stock in the corporation without first offering
it to the corporation and then to the other common shareholders. It
appears that the ex-spouse's stock was not offered pursuant to such
provisions since the decree provided that the stock was to be sold
immediately after the transfer at a set price.
the time of its transfer to the other spouse the initial
conclusion might be that the IRS would seek to tax the
inherent gain to the transferor. Obviously, however, the
tax stakes are not as high as when the transfer of ripe
property is to a charity in whose hands the gain might
well be exempt. It is, perhaps, for this reason that the IRS
in LTR 9046004 acknowledges the hegemony in such a
situation of § 1041, providing that no gain or loss will be
recognized on the transfer of property from an individual
to a spouse (or former spouse) incident to a divorce.
Thus, not only does § 1041 negate judicial authority like
US. v. Davis but it also renders quiet normally ap-
plicable assignment of income rules (thus allowing the
parties to negotiate where the tax burden on the sale of
property will fall and to agree on the terms of such a sale
in advance of the transfer).4
3 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
4 Of course, the shift of the tax burden on the sale of property
transferred pursuant to a divorce will not result in significant tax
savings in any event (especially in these times of collapsed tax
brackets). Depending upon the outcome of the negotiations one of the
two partners to the marriage will bear the tax burden of the sale (thus
making it starkly different from the assignment of "ripe" property to
a charity).
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SECURITY IN ADDITION TO
THE RESIDENCE DOES NOT
FOIL 'QUALIFIED RESIDENCE
INTEREST'
It is clear, of course. that interest on either "acquisition
indebtedness" or "home equity indebtedness" is deduct-
ible as "qualified residence interest."8 One of the essen-
tial requirements of either acquisition or home equity
indebtedness is that the debt be secured by such indeb-
tedness. What is the result, however, if the lender needs
security in addition to that provided by the residence
itself? This could occur, for example, if the indebtedness
equaled, or nearly equaled, the market value of the
property (since lenders are generally reluctant to lend an
amount equal to the full value of the property). In such
a situation the lender might be willing to lend an amount
equal to the full value of the property only if the security
of the property itself were supplemented by the security
of additional property. As LTR 9038023 makes clear,
this should not impair qualification of the full amount of
the interest as "qualified residence interest."The statute's
simple requirement is that the debt be secured by the
"qualified residence." Thus, in LTR 9038023, where the
lender loaned $950,000 on the security of the residence
and on an amount which the taxpayer was required to
7 18 U.S.C. §3282.
%§ 163(h)(3)(B). (C).
' See. Reg. § 1.1 63-I0T(o)( I) for definition of secured debt.
keep on deposit with the lender, interest on the entire
debt met the "qualified residence interest" standard. Al-
though the subject letter ruling dealt with acquisition
indebtedness, the same conclusion would presumably be
reached with respect to "home equity indebtedness."
Thus, a taxpayer could borrow an amount (e.g. $60,000)
to purchase an expensive automobile. Although the
lender would quite naturally take a chattel mortgage on
the vehicle, interest on the loan would meet the qualified
residence interest standard if such additional debt were
secured by the residence (even though the aggregate
debt--the mortgage on the residence and the auto loan-
exceeded the value of the residence).
9
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IRS sweeps most of tax preparption fees into mis-
cellaneous itemized deduction category. Ever since
the 1986 enactment of §67, placing a two-percent floor
on those deductions in the category known as miscel-
laneous itemized deductions, there has been concern
regarding the appropriate classification of tax return
preparation fees. The regulations (Reg. § 1.62-IT(d)) re-
quire that "above the line" items must be "directly con-
nected with the conduct of the trade or business" and
offer state income taxes on net business income as an
example of an item that is "merely remote" to the busi-
ness and, hence, subject to the two-percent floor. In
LTR 9126014 the IRS wrestles with the treatment of
tax preparation costs in a typical situation where the
taxpayer had a sole proprietorship (a CPA consulting
fim) reportable on Schedule C, rental properties report-
able on Schedule E, and equity interests in a partner-
ship and an S corporation. Regarding the Schedule C
and E costs the IRS, stating that such preparation costs
are analogous to state income taxes on net income, con-
cluded that they were only "remotely" connected with
the business and that their deductibility was controlled
by § 212(3), thereby causing such amounts to be sub-
ject to the two-percent floor. For criticism and analysis
of this result, see Storrer, "Deducting Tax-Related
Professional Fees," Tax Notes, June 24, 1991, p. 1575,
which indicates that the last word on this difficult sub-
ject has not yet been written. With respect to the pass-
through entities (the taxpayer received K-Is reflecting
his share of net income including an offset for prepara-
tion of the entity's return), the IRS did not impose a
grouping which would have subjected these expenses
to the two-percent floor (finding, instead, that the costs
were directly related to the obligation of the entity to
file an information return and were, thus, deductible
under § 162).
LETTER RULING REVIEW
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IRS ALLOWS DEFENSE COSTS
OF DIRECTOR UNDER §212
In the past the IRS has drawn the line between profes-
sional and nonprofessional fiduciaries, allowing the
former to deduct their expenses under § 162 but main-
tainin that the best the latter could get is a §212 deduc-
tion.1 The Service has in the past been more aggressive
when the issue becomes, instead, the tax treatment of
legal fees and settlements paid in defending suits which
urge (on the part of a trustee or corporate director) mis-
management or negligence.
14
IRS ruling policy more lenienL In LTR 9039023 the
taxpayer, a corporate director with other full-time
employment, incurred attorneys' fees and paid setilement
amounts in connection with a suit brought by an investor
in the corporation of which the taxpayer was a director.
The plaintiff, seeking recompense for the stock of the
corporation in which he had invested and which had
become worthless, alleged that the taxpayer had a duty
to inform the plaintiff of certain facts about the corpora-
tion in which he was about to invest. The Service cast
aside the prior tough litigating policy by readily conced-
ing that the taxpayer was, indeed, able to deduct the legal
12 Since no such legislative history exists with respect to other
U.S. possessions, property located therein would not qualify (per
§1031(h)) as "like" U.S. real property.
13 E.g., Rev. Rul. 72-316. 1972-1 C.B. 96.
14 See, e.g.. Carl F. Fayen 34 T.C. 630 (1960), denying a business
expense deduction to a trustee charged with mismanagement on the
ground that the taxpayer is not engaged in carrying on a trade or
business as a trustee; see, also, Sheldon Solomon. T.C. Memo. 1974-
127. Cf.. Nathan Cummings. 60 T.C. 91 (1973). in which the IRS
conceded that the taxpayer's activities as a corporate director con-
stituted a trade or hisi.,-
fees and settlement amount.
15
What is level of activity? Although LTR 9039023
does not rely on prior case authority which, if applied,
would have denied the deduction, there is still the issue
of whether legal fees and settlement amounts paid by a
corporate directorare § 162 or §212 expenses. Obviously,
the latter classification would result in application of the
2% floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions. Upon
the conclusion that being a corporate director is not a
sufficient level of activity to constitute a tradeor business,
this is the result reached in the subject letter ruling. 16
Is In doing so the IRS eschewed any reliance on the notion that
a charge of mismanagement or negligence is inherently "personal"
rather than profit oriented, deciding, instead, that the "origin of the
claim" test (U.S. v.Gilmnore. 372 U.S. 39 (1963)) compelled deduction
as either a business expense (§162) or as a §212 expense.
16 Reliance is placed upon R. Walter Graham, Jr. 40 T.C. 14
(1963). in which the court found that full-time employment coupled
with being a corporate director would prevent that latter activity from
rising to the level of a trade or business. The Court of Appeals reversed
(326 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1964)) and found that a single corporate
directorship was a §212 activity and it was on that basis that LTR
9039023 so classified the payments. The implication is that several
directorships. especially if unaccompanied by other employment,
would rise to the level of a trade or business.
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SMALL ADS IN PROGRAM
BOOK DON'T GENERATE UBI,
BUT LARGER ONES DO
One of most pesky unrelated business income (UBI)
issues relates to income from program advertising.
The court of appeals decision in NCAA v. Comm.
2 1
must, however, be regarded as a very pro-taxpayer
break- through in this area. Although LTR 9044071 was
issued less than two months before the opinion in
NCAA 22 and therefore does not have the benefit of its
enlightened viewpoint, it is instructive of whatever
movement may be taking place in the Service's position
on this issue.
Program book distributed to organization's 800
members at annual conference. The advertising effort,
which includes attempts to obtain advertising from the
organization's members, was handled in full by the
book's publisher with the latter remitting to the exempt
org a fixed percentage of advertising sales. The "front of
the book" was devoted to textual material relating to the
organization's activities whereas the latter third con-
sisted of "paid listings of various businesses within the
state served by the organization" which often contained
a "commercial logo and/or slogan describing the ser-
vices or goods provided by the business." The size of the
ads varied from a full page to two or four per page all the
way down to 24 or 48 per page (or even small listings, at
over 70 per page, containing the name and address of
the business).
Advertising is "regularly carried on." In reaching
this conclusion the IRS avoided any of the enlightened
thinking of CA-10 in NCAA. 23 The six-to-eight week
solicitation period, coupled with the time necessary for
the preparation of the advertising copy, was enough, the
0 See, e.g, "Real Difficulty Exists in Avoiding UBi Tax on
Program Advertising," Letter Ruling Review, Oct. 1989, p. 3.
21 66 AFTR 2d 90-5602 (10th Cir. 1990).
22 LTR 9044071 was issued Aug. 8. 1990;, NCAA was decided
Sept. 20, 1990.
23 For advertising income to be UBI it must be (i) income from a
trade or business; (ii) such trade or business must be regularly carried
on by the organization; and (iii) the conduct of the trade or business
must not be substantially related to the performance of the org's
exempt function. See, Reg. §1.513-1(a). Most UBI cases involving
advertising come down to whether the requirement in (ii) exists.
IRS held, for the activity not to be "intermittent.' 24 This
conclusion runs exactly contra to NCAA which held that
in deciding the "regularly carried on" issue it is neces-
sary to look to the time span of the event to which the
advertising relates (in NCAA it would be the tournament,
in LTR 9044071 it would be the annual conferenceand
not the time spent in preparing and selling the ads. By
sweeping to the conclusion that the advertising activity
was "regularly carried on" the IRS avoided the thorny
issue of whether the "activities occur so infrequently that
neither their recurrence nor the manner of their conduct
will cause them to be regarded as trade or business
regularly carried on."2 6 If the infrequent nature of the
activity were looked at it would be hard for a court
applying the reasoning in NCAA to escape the con-
clusion that the advertising was not "regularly carried
on.
, 27
No commercial benefit to advertiser. There is a
crack in the Service's position which allowed them to
toss a sop to the organization. If the advertising is of
such a nature28 that it "would...be difficult [for the
patron] to justify on a commercial basis..." it can be
presumed that it takes on the character of a complimen-
tary contribution and does not generate UBI.29 Looking
solely at the size of the ads-and not the other factors
that could well indicate that the ads were purchased on a
"complimentary contribution" basis-the IRS decreed
that those ads on a 48-per page, or smaller, basis did not
generate UBI. The "larger" ads did, though, since, in the
Service's view, even the 24-per page advertisers could
"reasonably be expected to derive more than a negligible
or inconsequential commercial benefit" from the ad.
24 The IRS reached this conclusion even though this six-to-eight
week solicitation period was shorter than the three-month period
involved in Rev. Rut. 73-424, 1973-2 C.B. 190, in which the IRS
found that income from advertising in an annual yearbook was UBI.
Finding that the advertising income was not "passive" (in reaching
this conclusion the services of the publisher were imputed to the
exempt org) the IRS in 9044071 also quickly dismissed the argument
that the advertising income was royalty income and, therefore, ex-
empt from UBI by reason of§ 512(bX2).
25 The NCAA court stated that "...the tournament is the relevant
time frame for those who choose to pay for advertising in the pro-
gram" in contrast to the advertising involved in US. v. American
College of Physicians. 475 U.S. 834 (1986), "where advertisements
were sold for each issue in a monthly medical journal."
2.6 Reg. § 1.513-1 (c)(2)(iii).
27 Presumably, too, the Tax Court, applying the reasoning and
approach of its decision in Suffolk County Patrolmen's Assn., 77 T.C.
1314 (1981). would arrive at the same conclusion.
2 Considering, for example, the manner in which the publication
is distributed, its territorial scope, the commercial or noncommercial
flavor of methods used to solicit ads, etc.
29 Rev. Rul. 76-93. 1976-1 CB. 170.
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§170 DEDUCTION TO BUYER
OF NONPROFIT'S STOCK, BUT
IRS SCRUTINIZES
It should be elementary that the purchase of stock in
an organization cannot constitute a deductible charitable
contribution. The person acquiring stock in the organiza-
tion is receiving value in return for the outlay and such
is, of course, fully inconsistent with a deduction under
§ 170.7 Generally speaking, nonprofit corporations may
be organized on a membership or stock basis. If a non-
profit is organized on the former basis, payments in the
form of dues or fees may be deductible in whole or part
(assuming the organization is one described in
§ 170(cX2)) if the transferor receives or expects to receive
only indirect or insubstantial benefits such as the satis-
faction of furthering a charitable cause.8
Nonprofit issues stock. If a nonprofit is organized on
a stock basis the contributor acquires stock in the cor-
poration. As LTR 9035074 makes clear the acquisition
of a "piece of paper" in the form of a share certificate
will not deprive the taxpayer of a charitable deduction
where the purchases of such stock is "analogous to the
payment of a membership fee... ' 9 It is essential that the
ownership of the nonprofit's stock confers no "substan-
tial right or privilege upon the shareholder, other than
the right to participate in the management" of the or-
ganization. Thus, the stock can't be redeemable by the
corporation nor does it entitle the shareholder to a share
of the assets if the corporation dissolves. If, therefore,
the share ownership confers any proprietary rights (as it
may under some state statutes) no charitable deduction
will be available to the acquirer of such stock.
Close scrutiny of whether share ownership confers
benefit. Even though the share ownership in LTR
9035074 conferred no proprietary rights the IRS did not
stop there. The organization involved in LTR 9035074
issued a newsletter which was "not of commercial
quality" and was not available to nonmembers by paid
subscription or through newsstand sales. Hewing to its
recent toughness on the question of the effect of value
received by a contributor the IRS, in LTR 9035074,
examines the newsletter received by the nonprofit's
shareholders but concludes that it is "without measurable
fair market value or cost." (See Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-8
I.R.B. 20, 21, setting forth the circumstances in which
receipt of a newsletter by a shareholder or member will
not affect the availability of a charitable deduction.)The
bottom line seems to be that the existence of a newsletter
won't hinder a charitable deduction if it exists to inform
members about the activities of the organization. Lest
the Service appear too soft in this entire area it hangs a
cloud over the situation by announcing that "personal
benefit" could exist (thereby resulting in no charitable
deduction) if a group acts in concert to acquire shares of
a nonprofit in order to secure control of the organization.
Thus, in what may be a questionable construction, the
IRS does not necessarily equate personal benefit with
financial benefit.
7 As the Supreme Court said in American Bar Endoment r. US5.,
477 U.S. 105, !18 (1986), "thesinequa non orachaitablecontrihu-
lion is a transfer of money or property without adequate considera-
lion." The Court put it another way in Hernandez '. Comm., 109 S.
CL 2136, 2144 (1989), involving an attempt by Scientologists to
deduct, as charitable contributions, amounts paid fora church proce-
dure known as auditing, stating that the words "contribution or gift"
are "intended to differentiate between unrequited payments to
qualified recipients and payments made to such recipients in return
for goods or services." Of course, the taxpayer may be entitled to a
deduction if the price significantly exceeds the value of the good or
service purchaed. Rev. Rul. 67-246. 1967.2 C.B. 104.
Rev. Rul. 68-4321, 1968-2 C.B. 104.
9 it LTR 9035074 the organization involved converted frtim status
as a membership organization to a stock organization, hence prompt-
ine the request for a ruling on the eligibility of the share purchase
pricc lor a § 170 deduction.
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SETTLEMENT DISTRIBUTION
OF APPRECIATED PROPERTY
TO CHARITABLE
BENEFICIARY RESULTS IN
DEDUCTION
Charitable trusts are, of course, permitted a charitable
deduction for amounts -which pursuant to the terms of
the governing instrument" are paid for a §170(c) pur-
pose. Query whether this will be the result if a charitable
trust strikes a settlement, pursuant to which a lump-sum
distribution is made, with a beneficiary with which it has
had a disagreement? LTR 9044047 faces up to whatever
obstacles may have existed to a charitable deduction
under §642(c) for the distributing trust.
Charitable lead trust. One-half of the income of the
trust for the term, which was funded with appreciated
publicly held stock, was to be distributed to an identified
§501(c)(3) organization. Following the settlement of the
dispute between the beneficiary and the trust (which was
sanctioned by a court interpreting the trust instrument
with the participation of the state's attorney general) a
distribution, constituting 16.3% of the trust's principal,
was made in complete termination of the charity's inter-
est. Two threshold requirements of a §642(c) charitable
deduction--that it be made pursuant to the governing
instrument and that the distribution be from income-
had to be dealt with. With respect to the first, it was held
that the settlement distribution, being approved by the
court (and pursuant to settlement authority in the instru-
ment) was, indeed, pursuant to the instrument.4 2 Al-
though the distribution was itself corpus it resulted in
income realization to the trust since it was made in
satisfaction of a specified obligation.
43
42 Noting that a settlement agreement arising from a will contest
qualifies as a governing instrument (Rev. RuL. 59-15, 1959-1 C.B.
164). LTR 9044047 states that "the definition of governing instru-
ment is flexible."
Charitable deduction washes out gain realized
upon distributon Assume, for example, that the assets
distributed in settlement of the charity's interest had a
basis of $20x and a value of $50x, thus causing a $30x
gain to the trust upon distribution. Although capital gains
are not normally included in DNI they would be here
since they would be considered allocated to charity.4
Thus, if the trust had $40x ordinary income in addition,
its gross income would be $70x. which could be reduced
by a $30x charitable deduction.45 The charitable
beneficiary would be charged with receiving that capital
gain through the DNI passthrough rules but it would be
offset by the §642(c) deduction. Thus, even though a
settlement distribution results in income to a charitable
trust that income can be effectively "washed-out"
through the bestowal of a §642(c) charitable deduction.
4 3 Since the distribution was of a specific percentage of the trust's
corpus the situation in LTR 9044047 does not seem to be specifically
analogous to the specific dollar amount involved in Kenan v. Comm..114 F.2d 217 (2nd Cir. 1940) (which is the decision standing for the
principle that gain realization occurs to a trust or estate upon thedistribution of appreciated property in satisfaction of a fixed obliga-
tion). See, also. Reg. §.661(a)-2(f)(1) which represents the ad-
ministrative statement of this rule. It even appears to be removed
from the obligation to pay a fixed annuity that was involved in Rev.Rut. 83-75, 1983-1 C.B. 114, since that too, like Kenan, involved a
specific dollar amount. Nevertheless, the IRS felt that the courtjudgment, along with the "deficiency" provisions of the trust instru-
ment (designed to" insure an equitable distribution to the incomebeneficiaries down through the years) did create an "obligation" even
though not expressed in dollar terms.
44 §643(a)(3).
45 Even though $50x in value was distributed to the charity. only$30x would be eligible for a charitable deduction since only that
portion of the distribution was from income.
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IRS INVOKES LOCAL LAW TO
STRIKE DOWN CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTION OF LIFE
INSURANCE
Everyone has thought for years (hat the gift of an
insurance policy to a charity entitles the donor to income
and gift tax deduction (plus, in addition, it removes the
policy proceeds from the decedent's gross estate). These
results, along with the attractiveness of being able to
make a large bequest "on the installment plan" (i.e,
through relatively small premium payments), of being
able to guarantee that the donee charity will collect a
certainamount, 1 of not impairing other assets of the estate
(all that is "leaving" the estate is the annual premium
less the charitable deduction tax saving) and the fact that
the insurance proceeds do not increase probate or ad-
ministration costs, have combined to make inter vivo$
transfers of insurance a common planning approach.
Now, however, in a very technical holding (LTR
9110016), relying heavily on the notion that the donee
charity did not acquire an "insurable interest" under New
York law, the IRS has trashed this planning device to
such an extent, that if it is correct (and it probably is not),
then none of the sought-for results will be obtained.
Gift tax and income tax deductions thought to be
available. The rules regarding donations of life insurance
seem fairly clear. For income tax purposes the charitable
donation of a policy should entitle the donor to a deduc-
tion equal to its fair market value.2 If the policy is as-
signed on the day it is taken out (which will often be the
case). 3 the deduction would be limited to the amount of
'Securities or real property, for example, are subject to deprecia-
tion.
2 Reg. §l.170A-(cXt).
3 This was the case, in fact, in LTR 9110016 and was used by the
Service to support the charity's lack of an insurable inti-mt (i.e., the
charity was treated as having received the policy directly from the
insurance company).
the initial premium then in force.4 The income tax
charitable deduction would be reduced by that amount
which would be treated as ordinary income, generally
resulting in limiting the charitable deduction to the
donor's basis. Most donors enter into an agreement (or
letter of intent) with the donee charity regarding their
wishes with respect to the policy proceeds (and stating
their intent to make a contribution equal to the annual
premium). Generally, though, it has been assumed that
both income and gift tax charitable deductions for the
premium contributions were readily available.6
IRS wreaks havoc on donation. In what can only be
described as a parade of horribles the IRS (as stated,
relying upon the conclusion that the charity had no in-
surable interest) sweeps away every conceivable tax
benefit that would seem to follow such a transfer. Since
the transaction "violates" local law, the insurance com-
pany may not have to pay the proceeds to the charity or,
if it does, the fiduciary may maintain an action to recover
the proceeds. This state of affairs says the IRS, results
in a nondeductible partial interest and one with respect
to which it had not been shown that the chance the charit'i
would be divested was "so remote as to be negligible.'
Similarly, the donor would be denied a gift tax deduction
for even a partial interest 9 since there was no showing
that any such retained interest was "susceptible of valua-
tion." As if this was not enough the IRS would include
the policy proceeds in the decedent's gross estate under
§2035 if she died within three years of the policy assign-
ment and §2033 if she did not (on the ground that the
estate fiduciary could recover the proceeds for the benefit
of her estate). Lest anyone think that inaction by the
estate's fiduciary would at least entitle the estate to an
estate tax charitable deduction, the IRS negated that too
by concluding that. in such a situation, the policy
proceeds would be deemed to have passed as a result of
the fiduciary's action and not the decedent's. Despite all
this naysaying one should by no means consider that the
death knell has been sounded to the charitable transfer
of life insurance (but maybe a passing glance to distin-
guish applicable local law from that existing in New York
would be worthwhile).
A Rev. Rut. 58-.373. 1958-2 C.B. 99.
5 §170(cXIXA). A policy transferred right after being acquired
would, thus. have a basis equal to that first premium.
6 See. e.g.. LTR 8714037. which blessed an income tax deduction
for the annual premium payments.
§17%f)(3).
Reg. §§'1. 170A- i(e); 1. l 7 0A-7(a)3).
9 Partial because of the possibility that the proceeds would be paid
47 to the insured's estate.
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EXEMPT HOSPITAL CAN OPEN
ITS FITNESS CENTER TO
PUBLIC WITHOUT UBI
Whether the operation of recreation centers (now, one
supposes, generally referred to as fitness centers) by an
exempt organization can be related to the organization's
exempt purpose so as not to produce UB, has been an
interesting issue. While the IRS has not gone so far as
to hold that the provision of fitness services to healthy
people fits with the notion that health promotion is simply
a part the general concept of charity, there seems to be
the concept that a fitness facility can be a charitable
activity if it provides recreation available to a large seg-
ment of the community. 14 At the same time, however,
the IRS has shown no willingness to find the lack of
unrelated business income when the fitness center is
operated in a "commercial manner" by an admittedly
exempt organization (a §501(c)(3)organization whose
purpose was to provide for the welfare of young
people). 15 The rap against this organization, which was
found to have UBI, was that its health club, in which
anyone could participate for an annual fee (similar to that
charged by local commercial clubs), was that its "com-
mercially comparable annual dues or daily fees...are suf-
ficiently high to restrict the health club's use to a limited
number of the members of the community." 
16
13 E.g,. for the reason that lite promotion of health lessens the
government's burdens.
14 Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113. which relies on Isabel
Perers. 21 T.C. 55 (1953). a § 170 case involving acorporation formed
to operate a public beacl, playground and bathing facility which was
held to be -charitable."
tj Rev. Rul. 79-360. 1979-2 C.B. 236.
Hospital operates health and fitness center open to
public. In these days, of course, hospitals-even exempt
hospitals-have become multi-dimensional in the ser-
vices they provide. Thus, one can easily envision the
fitness center operated by the hospital in LTR 91 10042-
a facility open to the public as well as to the hospital's
patients and employees. Although it was easy to class
those who used the facility at a doctor's recommendation
as "patients," 17 the difficulty came as a result of the wide
public use of the facility and the rate differential for use
by the general public. The apparent key to the favorable
result reached was the organization's statement that its
rates were "low enough so that a significant segment of
the population of the area [could] afford to participate"
and that they were "lower than commercial rates in the
arma.119 Thus, the fact that permitted the IRS to distin-
guish LTR 9110042 from its prior adverse published
position was the setting of the facility's fees so as to
make its "services generally available to the local public."
The aphorism "moderation in all things" appears, again,
to have pertinence (the only drawback is that LTR
9110042 is without any gui'dance on what fee structure
would appear reasonable).20
16 In the same vein is Rev. Rut. 79-36 t, 1979-2 C.B. 237, in which
the operation of a miniature golf course in a commercial manner by
a charitable organization operating to provide forthe welfare of young
people. was detennined to result in UBL
"' Rev. RuL 68-376. 1968-2 C.B. 246 (situation no. 6).
18 Although the IRS had no data on the percentage of uers who
would be from the general public (and not frun the employee or
patient group) it was conceded "that a significant portion of itie
...patrons would be drawn from the general public and have no other
connection to your health care activities..."
19 Oddly. the IRS also noted that there were -no comparable
commercial facilities in the area.- How is it possible to make tle
conparison if there is nothing appropriate to compare it to7
20 The implication is. though. that a moderate, non-country club
fee structure should pass muster. Further. there is no hint that it cannot
be a structure that would adequately cover the organization's costs
and then some.
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VHEN CARRYBACK USED
GAINST PRIOR DEFICIENCY
NTEREST STOPS ON DUE
)ATE EVEN WHEN RETURN IS
:ARDY
A carryback can eliminate a deficiency or underpay-
ient occurring in a prior year (the carryback year). This
Lill leaves, though, an interest obligation with respect to
-e prior underpayment. Generally speaking, interest is
ue from the due date of the return for the year of
nderpayment until the "filinf date" for the taxable year
n which the carryback arises." 5 Although "filing date" is
efrmed 16 as the last date prescribed for filing the return
or the taxable year (determined without regard to exten-
ions), it is necessary, when tardy returns are filed, to
letermine whether interest will run until the due date of
he return or until the actual date on which the delin-
luent return was filed.
Returns for years in which carrybacks arose were
iot timely. In the situation involved in LTR 9127004 the
axpayer's corporate returns for fiscal years ending June
30, 1985 and June 30, 1986, though due September 15 in
mach of those years, were not filed until August 6. 1986
md December 12, 1986, respectively. Although the Dis-
trict Office took the position that interest on the under-
payment occurring in the fiscal year ending June 30,
1985 ran until August 6, 1986 (the actual filing date of
the return for fiscal year ending June 30, 1985), and for
that portion of the underpayment reduced by the car-
ryback from fiscal year ending June 30, 1986, until
December 12, 1986 (the actual filing date of the return
for June 30, 1986), the IRS, on technical advice, adopted
a more reasonable stance. Since interest is an amount
paid for the use of money the IRS reasons that the prior
underpayment should be considered satisfied, for inter-
est computation purposes, on the date that the return for
the year in which the carryback arises is due (that being,
it appears, the date on which the carryback amount is
properly creditable to satisfy the past liability). 17 Thus,
while a panoply of penalties may await taxpayers who
file tardily (without obtaining a proper extension), for
15 The existence of an NOL or capital loss carryback shall not
affect the calculation of interest "for the period ending with the fiing
date for the taxable year in which the net operating loss or net capital
loss arises." OI601(d)(l). A similar principle applies with respect to
credit carrybacks. §6601 (d)(2).
S§6611(f)(3)(A).
17 This conclusion was aided, no doubt, by the change made by
TEFRA in 1982 which amended §6601(d) by substituting "filing
date for the taxable year" for "the last day of the taxable year."
years in which a carryback arises, it is not necessary to
count among such sanctions continued running of inter-
est on prior underpayments. The carryback is deemed
applicable on the due date of the return for the year in
which the carryback arises thus terminating the running
of interest on prior underpayments (to which the car-
ryback is applicable) on that date.
18
1S This result would apply even when the taxpayer obtains an
extension causing the return to be timely filed after the due date.
Interest would still cease to run on the due date of the return not the
subsequent actual filing date. §661 1(f)(3)(A).
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ABATEMENT OF
DELINQUENCY PENALTY BY
SERVICE CENTER NOT 'FINAL'
One would hope that when the taxpayer convinces the
IRS service center to abate a penalty (asserted, quite
likely, by way of a computer-generated notice) that that
would be the end of it. Having made a forceful, and
apparently effective plea, that "reasonable cause" ex-
isted, 33 the taxpayer can only feel that he has been "had"
if, after the return is selected for examination, the penalty
is reasserted.3 4 This is exactly what occurred in LTR
9111005 (which involved the service center's abatement
of the §6651 penalty with respect to a tardily-filed estate
tax return). When the estate tax examiner later asserted
the same penalty the taxpayer made what amounts to an
estoppel-type argument.
Regs clearly provide for abatement. The language
does contain some support for the taxpayer's position,
i.e., "If the district director, the director of the service
center, or where applicable, the [director of the Bureau
of Alcohol, Firearms, etc.], determines that the delin-
quency was due to reasonable cause and not to willful
neglect, the addition to the tax will not be assessed."
35
One could interpret this language as bestowing some
"finality" to the service center's determination that
"reasonable cause" exists. Not surprisin/v, the IRS
regards the situation as much more fluid. When the
Tax Court has been faced with this (or a related issue)
it falls back on its time-honored maxim that it will not
"look behind the notice of deficiency to examine ad-
ministrative actions..." 37 In the ebb and flow of ad-
ministrative fact finding nothing is "final" until specifi-
cally made so (even if, it would appear, there is taxpayer
33 As the regulations (Reg. §301.6651- l(cXl)) instruct.
34 Tie source for this annoyance is that the taxpayer, even though
successful in convincing one level of the IRS on tie reasonable cause
issue may be called upon to convince another (and higher) level of
its position (which is the opposite of taking an adverse finding to the
appeals level).
35 Reg. §310.665 [-1(c)(1).
36 As does its manual which states: "Tiis responsibility (to assert
the delinquency penalty] exists even though a service center...tmay
have determined reasonable cause for delay in filing, or asserted
delinquency penalty. The examiner may find that the orginal deter-
mination was based on incomplete facts or on a slante .statemcnt of
facts." Internal Revenue Manual. Audit. §4562.1(2).
37 Estate of Wilbanks. 94 T.C. 306, 315 (1990).
reliance on the IRS' administrative abatement). 38 Thus,
in LTR 9111005, the first flush of glee which accom-
panied abatement of the service center's action was
tempered by the realization that the estate tax examiner
(more apt to probe and with more time to do so) was
asserting a penalty thought to have been a former prob-
lem. The Tax Court tosses off the observation that the
taxpayer did not establish the "existence of a closing
agreement or any other binding agreement which would
preclude" the IRS from later determining the penalty.
39
Since there would be only two ways to accomplish this-
either through an offer in compromise or through a clos-
ing areement-and since neither is realistically avail-
able, taxpayers in receipt of service center notices of
abatement, especially those thought vulnerable to audit,
should by no means put all penalty thoughts behind them.
38 E.g.. Ser-tice Bolt & Nut Co. Trust. 78 T.C. 812. 821 (1982).
in which abatements of assessments caused the taxpayers to believe
that no deficiency notices would be issued (causing taxpayers to cease
doing business and to distribute their assets).
39 Ectate of Wilbanks. 94 T.C. at 315. LTR 9111005 similarly
notes that the IRS "had no binding agreement with the taxpayer
concerning the finality of the initial determination of reasonable
cause...
40 An offer in compromise (§7122) is most often used when'doubt
exists as to collectibility and rarely used in situations involving doubt
as to liability. When it is employed in the latter context it is usually
after the issuance of a 90-day letter, and tie taxpayer's failure to
respond. with the taxpayer being generally required to establish that
there would be hardship if the tax were required to be paid. The crux
of the matter is. though. doubt as to liability and it was on that basis
that the taxpayer in LTR 9111005 made an offer in compromise
(rejected) with rTspect to thedelinquency penalty. Cloing agreements
(§7121). which are intended to enable the taxpayer to finally resolve
a controversy, are typically utilized in connection with matters in
appe;ds. are not likely to be used to conclusively resolve a penalty
issue which may only be a small part of the taxpayer's tax picture
for that year. See. generally. Saltzman. IRS Practice and procedure.
paras. 9.09. ei seq.. 15.03(41.
